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The Ftihrer Principle of International Law:
Individual Responsibility and Collective
Punishment
Larry Catai Backer*
Abstract
I offer here an extended Nietzschean joke: the necessity of error in
the constitution of individual authority and communal power.
Communities-the nation-state, religious communities, terrorist
organizations-are arranged through a cultivation of error: mistaking
causes for effects, assuming a false causality, creating an imagined
causality, and assuming a free will. These errors of causation, these
miscausations, have been offered as a means through which leaders or
leader classes-the judge, the priest, the king, the president, the
charismatic leader of violent sub-national communities-maintain
authority. In contrast, the community itself, those who are led,
dominated, controlled, manipulated, are considered only in the passive.
They are the victims, the weak-willed, the powerless, the sheep, the herd.
They obey because they must. But authority is not power, and reality is
more subtle and layered than what appears on the surface of
relationships. Just as the priest, the leader uses miscausation to create the
illusion of power and so protect and expand individual authority, so the
community uses miscausation to assert communal power-over the
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priest, the president, the judge, the leader-through the illusion of
weakness. The strong leader does not usurp power from the communal
weak; the herd, for its. own preservation as a herd, demands the
appearance of overlordship of the leader. The cult of the leader, of the
individual solely responsible for her acts, and of communities consisting
of passive amalgams free from responsibility serve as the foundation for
modem human rights and humanitarian law. But the cult of the leader
itself constitutes a titanic act of mis-causation in four parts: (1) that
communities are protected not because they are weak, but because they
are strong, to protect the community against blame for action committed
in its name by its leaders; (2) that the leader is dependent on the
community; the leader acts in conformity to the wishes of the people;
(3) that the leader then serves as proxy for the community; the doctrine
of personal responsibility for communal acts protects a community by
sacrificing its leaders for acts of communal wrongs; and (4) that the
community, the sheep, are in actuality the Shepherd in a world arranged
to minimize the costs of inter-community conflicts for power. For
modem political and legal theory, this misunderstanding unveils the
perversity of the logic of modem international humanitarian law. I will
offer an example-the way international humanitarian law, used to
condemn punitive house demolitions in Israel, serves to subsidize the
maintenance of the cultural production of hatred which constitutes
communal permission to engage in individual acts of violence against not
Israelis, but Jews.
But what astonished me more was that they thrust their fingers into a
region where we women as a rule allow --- to enter. At first I
thought this very strange-it is remarkable how travel broadens the
mind-but I later learnt that the purpose was to discover if we had
concealed any diamonds. The practice had been established from
time immemorial among the highly efficient nations that scour the
seas. I have been told that the religious Knights of Malta never
neglect it when they capture Turks of either sex. It is a part of the
law of nations, from which they never deviate. I
This essay is offered as an extended Nietzschean joke: the necessity
of error in the constitution of individual authority and communal power.
I start with an apocryphal story of the constitution of power and
community, the story of the elevation of Saul to the throne of Israel and
his subsequent removal. The story of Saul provides the recipe for the
construction of authority and the constitution and perpetuation of the
I. VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE 27 (Norman Cameron, trans., Penguin Books, Ltd. 1997)
(1759) (The Old Woman's Story).
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power of community through a process of veiling and misdirection. As
between the leader and the community, the leader has authority, but may
lead only by following the will of the, community or by convincing the
community that the leader is implementing the will of the community.
Authority in this way produces an illusion of power; that illusion, when
internalized by the community, preserves the authority of the leader.2 As
between communities, the leader serves as a proxy for the community,
and as protection against communal extermination. When communities
act, individuals are held personally responsible.3 They stand in for the
community. The leader is offered up to suffer punishment for communal
action, the community is spared.
I then examine the particular ways in which miscausation is used in
the modem world to veil the relationships between authority and power,
between a leader and the community. The story of Saul and Israel is the
story of the modem world, written not in a slim passage of an ancient
text, but in a multi-layered nuanced system of law and custom that
applies with increasingly coercive force to all political communities on
the globe. That system is based on four inversions: (1) the portrayal of
communities as weak collectives; (2) the illusion of the leader as
independent of the community; (3) the deployment of the leader as a
proxy for the people of a community; and (4) the dispersal of power
within a community to be used by those who can deploy manifestations
of the will of the community.
Lastly, I apply the lessons of the kingship of Saul and the inversions
of modernity to explore the absurdity of our emerging system of
international law which is obsessed with individual responsibility for
communal acts and in which communal responsibility appears in the
academic literature as something of a novelty.4 For this purpose, I focus
2. For example, the Soviet leadership between 1917 and 1991 profited from the
illusion of power flowing from authority, and paid the ultimate price when the illusion
was shattered and the people replaced one representative of its power with another. See
Noam Chomsky, The Soviet Union Versus Socialism, 17 OUR GENERATION, 47-52
(1986). The Chinese Communist Party may suffer the same fate in this century as it
pushes and is pushed by its community out of its isolation and into the world.
3. The truth of communal action, of communal perpetuation of even the most
atrocious actions, is sometimes documented. With respect to the German community's
actions against the Jewish community and others, see DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN,
HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (Vintage
Books 1996); on the participation of the peoples of Spain in the Inquisition, see CECIL
ROTH, THE SPANISH INQUISITION (W.W. Norton & Co. 1996); on the participation of the
Khmer people in the purges of the 1970s, see WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, THE QUALITY OF
MERCY: CAMBODIA, HOLOCAUST AND MODERN CONSCIENCE (1984); on the communal
orchestration of the conflict between Tutsi and Hutu peoples in Rwanda, see, e.g.,
ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (Human
Rights Watch 1999).
4. See, e.g., John Quigley, State Responsibility for Ethnic Cleansing, 32 U.C.
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on the development of a purported prohibition under "international
humanitarian law" of collective punishment applied to house demolitions
in the territories-some of which have been determined by the
international community soon to become the state of Palestine 5-which
are currently administered by Israel. In particular, application of the
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War,6 serves to reinforce the power of the
community to nurture a fundamental culturally constitutive element-
demonification and hatred of some constructed "other"-in Western
culturally acceptable ways. International humanitarian law subsidizes
the cultural project of producing hatred as a communal activity, and taxes
state action that interferes with the collective activities of these
communities. Individuals, and the occasional leader, may be punished
for physical manifestations of communally produced hatred and
aspirations, but the community itself remains untouched. Miscausation,
Western-style, at its best!
I. Text: Constituting Community, Unmasking Power: Saul Law,
Narrative and Literary Analysis
The tale of the kingship of Saul forms the central element of my
exploration of the communal constitution of power. The story is well
known:
Then all the elders of Israel gathered themselves together and came to
Samuel.... And they said unto him: "Behold, thou art old, and thy
sons walk not in thy ways; now make us a king to judge us like all the
nations."... And Samuel prayed unto the Lord. And the Lord said to
Samuel: "Hearken unto the voice of the people in all that they say
unto thee; for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected Me,
that I should not be king over them .... ; howbeit thou shalt earnestly
forewarn them, and shall declare unto them the manner of the king
that shall reign over them."... And Samuel told all the words of the
DAVIS L. REV. 341 (1999); Josd E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons
Form Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 377 (1999).
5. It merely remains for the parties to accede to the international will in this matter.
This, certainly, has been the approach of the international press in its reports of the
agreement, fashioned among the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the
United Nations, for the formal partition of the old province of Palestine into the States of
Israel and Palestine. "The roadmap-developed by the United States, the United
Nations, the European Union and Russia, the so-called international diplomatic "quartet"
on the Middle East-lays out a series of steps to be taken in order to create a Palestinian
state by 2005." Matthew Lee, Mideast Roadmap to be Unveiled Once Palestinian PM
Confirmed by Bush, AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE [Corrected 03/14/03] 2003 WL 2752798.
6. Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, adopted Aug. 12, 1948, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (hereafter
the "41h Geneva Convention").
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Lord unto the people that asked of him a king.... But the people
refused to hearken unto the voice of Samuel; and they said: "Nay;
but there shall be a king over us; that we may also be like all the
nations; and that our king may judge us, and go out before us, and
fight our battles."
7
The story of the appointment of Israel's first king provides the West
with an illustration of a basic normative template constructing
relationships between power, action and authority within any organized
community. In the story of the eventual elevation of Saul to the throne
of Israel, God is the holder of ultimate power. The source of God's
power is control: the normative basis of community is the monopoly of
God. God, in this sense, is manifested as a code of conduct, as an
objectification of the means of defining communal taboos. God is the
representation of the borders of permissible conduct by the community.
But God does not command that a king be appointed. The people insist
on a king, so they could be like other people. God is, in this tale,
primarily the actualizer of the people's will. The power to act, to
demand a king, is in the people. Indeed, the people insist over the
objection of God. God's objection is based on a reluctance to permit
even a symbolic or apparent competition for control of the nonnative
structure of the community. God wants no king to become, or even to
appear to become, an alternative source of rule-making--"but they have
rejected Me, that I should not be king over them." 8 Yet God satisfies the
people's desire even as God condemns them for the choice they make.
9
Authority over the community, at the insistence of the people, thus
appears to pass from Samuel, the servant of God, ° to Saul, the servant of
7. 1 Samuel 8:4-7, 9-10, 19-20.
8. 1 Samuel8:7.
9. After Saul's coronation, God, through Samuel, sarcastically reminds the people
of their desire to ape the communities around them by insisting on a king, when by doing
so they were displacing their real king-God. I Samuel 12:12-14. "And all the people
said unto Samuel: 'Pray for thy servants unto the Lord thy God, that we die not; for we
have added unto all our sins this evil, to ask us a king."' I Samuel 12:19. God provides
some comfort. Though God first acknowledges the transgression-overthrowing the
direct overlordship of God for that of a man ("ye have indeed done all this evil."
I Samuel 12:20)--God also promises not to abandon this community "because it hath
pleased the Lord to make you a people unto Himself' (I Samuel 12:22), but only if the
community and its king "fear the Lord, and serve Him, and hearken unto His voice, and
not rebel against the commandment of the Lord." I Samuel 12:14.
10. Samuel was among that long line of men in Israel with a direct connection with
the Divine Voice. Samuel was the connection between the community as eternal
abstraction and the community as people at any one point in time. "And I will raise Me
up a faithful priest, that shall do according to that which is in My hearty and in My
mind..." I Samuel 3:35. On the nature of the relationship between the priest and the
community, see Larry Catd Backer, Retaining Judicial Authority: A Preliminary Inquiry
on the Dominion of Judges, -- WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. - (forthcoming, 2003).
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the people. As king, Saul becomes a different type of intermediary
between the community and its normative obligations, that is, with its
God. Saul, as king, is a leader one step removed from both popular and
divine power, yet responsible to both as the representative of both. In
Saul, we in the West have had appointed, at our insistence, our first
agnus dei. ''
And thus thejoke: both God and the people use the king to veil and
preserve their respective powers. The joke is on Saul and those who
follow. Saul quickly discovers that he has no power to defy either the
people or the normative ordering of society. He also discovers that in
contests between the community and the normative order, the leader will
bear responsibility for the acts or effects of either. Saul, holding
authority without power in fundamental matters, quickly finds himself
abandoned by both the people and God.12
God abandons Saul soon after the beginning of his reign when Saul,
impatient for the arrival of Samuel to perform sacred rites for the
community prior to a battle with the Philistines, took the priestly task of
sacrifice on himself.'3 Saul may pretend to the Philistines and other
11. The term agnus dei is better known in the contemporary West as a representation
of Jesus Christ, usually as a lamb with nimbus, holding a banner of the Cross on which
Jesus, the lamb, is sacrificed. For a discussion of the iconography of the Lamb in the
New and Old Testament, see, e.g., Maurice M. Hassett, The Catholic Encyclopedia
(Robert Appleton Company Vol. IIl, 1910). Moreover, this version of the meaning of
Saul's kingship assumes greater meaning for Christians when viewed as against the
decision by the People of Israel to abandon Jesus to the Romans for the preservation of
the nation, as recounted in the Gospel of John. See John 11:45 et seq. The imagery of
sheep and shepherd is common in the Jewish and Christian versions of the Bible. In the
days before the destruction of the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem, sheep were a common
sacrificial offering. See, e.g., Lev. 1:10, 4:32, 22:23, 27:26. The imagery of sheep and
shepherd in the constitution of communal government precedes the anointing of Saul --
Moses asks God to appoint a successor so "that the congregation of the Lord be not as
sheep which have no shepherd." Num. 27:17.
12. The joke has not been lost on the children of imperial power. See George
Orwell, Shooting an Elephant, in THE COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM, AND LETTERS OF
GEORGE ORWELL I 235 (1968) (relating experience as a British police officer in Burma
who chasing a rampaging elephant and finding it now docile, decides not to kill the
animal, until a mob forms with the expectation of action).
And suddenly I realized that I should have to shoot the elephant after all. The
people expected it of me and I had got to do it; I could feel their two thousand
wills pressing me forward, irresistibly.... Here was 1, the white man with his
gun, standing in front of the unarmed native crowd-seemingly the leading
actor of the piece; but in reality I was only an absurd puppet pushed to and fro
by the will of those yellow faces behind.... For it is the condition of his rule
that he shall spend his life in trying to impress the "natives," and so in every
crisis he has got to do what the "natives" expect of him. He wears a mask, and
his face grows to fit it.
Id. at 239.
13. 1 Samuel 13:8-14.
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communities against which Israel competes to have independent power
as king, to do as he sees right under the circumstances. But he is
absolutely subordinate to the normative power of the community. By
asserting power over the sacrifices Saul sought to assert power over God.
But he had no such power, and the kingdom would be taken from him as
punishment. 14
The people abandon Saul to his fate soon after that. God, through
Samuel, commanded Saul to lead the people in the destruction of the
Amalekites and all they possessed.15 The people chose to spare Agog,
the Amalekite king and the best of the Amalekite herds.' 6 Saul led, but
only as the follower of the people. Because he "feared the people, and
hearkened to their voice,"' 7 Saul was willing to "interpret the command of
God to suit the people. Again, the same result-Saul may appear to hold
power as well as authority as king, but he remains as subordinate to the
will of the people, as he was subordinate to the will of God.
The majesty of leadership-the crown of the king, the pomp and
circumstance of a President's address to Congress-thus veils the reality
of the relationship between leader, community, and the web of normative
rules within which the community acts. This illusion deploys the four
great errors of causation. 8 This illusion draws a veil of contentment.
This veil causes a blindness, a forgetfulness, that permits a self-
satisfaction, a sense of complete justice, in the prosecution of the leader
for the crimes of the "state." This veil permits the personification of the
state in the body of the leader (or leadership). Even within democratic
states, the international community is content to apply, even to leaders of
democratic regimes, as international human rights law, that old saying
attributed to that absolutist monarch, Louis XIV of France: L'etat c'est
moi. Thus, one can, without any trace of irony, suggest that "[t]The
conviction of Rwanda's Prime Minister and the arrest and prosecution of
Yugoslavia's President on charges of genocide represent a watershed
moment in the development of international law."'19 And it permits the
14. "And Samuel said to Saul: 'Thou hast done foolishly; thou hast not kept the
commandment of the Lord thy God .... ; for now would the Lord have established thy
kingdom upon Israel for ever. But now thy kingdom shall not continue."' I Samuel
13:13-14.
15. 1 Samuel 15:3.
16. 1 Samuel 15:9.
17. 1 Samuel 15:24.
18. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 464
(Walter Kaufmann, trans., Viking Press, 1972) (DIE GOTrER-DAMMERUNG, 1889) at 492-
501.
19. Michael J. Kelly, Can Sovereigns be Brought to Justice? The Crime of
Genocide's Evolution and the Meaning of the Milosevich Trial, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
257 (2002).
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ultimate sovereign of democratic theory2 °  the people-to remain
hidden. The collective, the ultimate sovereign, avoids responsibility for
the actions of the state, and its leader, of which it is the ultimate
authority. An irony? A hypocrisy? A miscausation? A fiihrer
principle2" of international law miscauses authority without
responsibility.
The confusion of cause and effect.22 Because Saul is vested with the
authority of kingship, he believes that he necessarily also has power to
the extent of the competence of his office. The office gives Saul
authority over community and norms. Saul believes, like we believe,
that this authority is the same as power over community and norms. Saul
comes to believe this, and acts on this belief. His reward is the loss of his
kingship. Thus, the Biblical tale is written to teach that Saul lost his
kingship because he disobeying God.
A higher reasoning might instruct that authority without power is
always lost-Saul could not succeed given the nature of his real
20. The German Federal Constitution memorializes this understanding nicely:
"(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state. (2) All
state authority emanates from the people. It shall be exercised by the people by means of
elections and voting and by specific legislative, executive, and judicial organs." GG Art.
20, quoted from DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 510 (2"d ed., 1997).
21. The term fiihrer principle is chosen deliberately to jar the reader. Stop long
enough to consider the utility of the term as description and subtextual comment with rich
ironic secondary meaning. In its descriptive sense, I use the term as the name of a
principle of leadership which, as I will show, serves as the lynchpin of international
humanitarian law. The use of the German terminology is used as a subtextual, and
naughty, reminder of the perversity and corruption of the condition to which the term
refers. The modern manifestation of a fiihrer principle of governance originated in
Germany during the period of Nazi rule, 1933-45, to describe principles of democratic
governance, centering on the notion of the leader as embodiment of the sovereignty of the
people. See Arthur Kaufmann, National Socialism and German Jurisprudence From
1933-1945, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1629, 1637-41 (1988) (law was an expression of
democratic will fo the community as embodied in Hitler). "In a nutshell, the Fuhrer
principle idolized Hitler as the single minded and decisive decisionmaker who leads the
German Volk to a bright future free of democratic quibbling." Marcus Dirk Drubber, The
German Jury and the Metaphysical Volk: from Romantic Idealism to Nazi Ideology 43
AM. J. CoMP. L. 227, 264 (1995). Having vanquished, at great cost, the socio-political
community which held to and acted on this principle, the West appears to have adopted
an inverted variant of the premise of this principle as the foundation of modern
humanitarian law. The West now distinguishes between a community that educates and
prepares its members for the commission of violent or criminal acts, and the individual
who actually effectuates the act. The individual actor is treated as an actor free of any
connection with or service for communities that might have made his actions possible in
tangible and intangible ways.
22. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, supra note 19 (The Four Great Errors
1-2, id. at 492-494). "The newspaper reader says: this party destroys itself by making
such a mistake. My higher politics says: a party which makes such mistakes has reached
its end; it has lost its sureness of instinct." Id. at 493-494.
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relationship to the people and to God. He feared disobeying a
community intent on preserving the riches of the Amalekites. 23  His
authority could not have prevented an act of the will of the people, his
kingship (and his life) would have been lost. But, even though he merely
acceded to the will of the comnunity, Saul could not escape punishment
by God. By obeying the people, Saul exceeded the breadth of the
authority given to him by God, a limited and directed authority made
manifest in a direct divine command. Acting as he did, permitting the
people to assert power over his authority, Saul acknowledges the limits
of his own power against the will of the people. But Saul's decision to
do as the people demanded, because Saul did not have power to do
otherwise, ironically causes Saul to" assert authority where he did not
have power-he disobeys the explicit command of God (effectively
breaching a core taboo of socio-religious conduct). Saul is trapped. And
thus another confusion of cause and effect: a leader can command only
what the community wishes to obey.
Illusion through the creation of a false causality.24  God has
elevated Saul to the kingship. As a result, Saul, as leader, must be more
than he was before he became king. Saul is now a symbol, a
representative; he must be more than himself. But even as king, Saul is
still only a man, and very much a part of the community over which he
was elevated. Saul remains a man among many people. Saul stands at
the crossroads of community and norms. What is Saul after he becomes
king? Here false causality comes to the rescue.
The people, grown weary of obedience to an abstraction (God),
choose to make God manifest on earth in the person of the king. But the
king is not the abstraction. He is merely an objectification of abstraction,
a second order abstraction functioning as a fetish-a symbol. Because
he is king, he stands for the state. But a fetish can never be the thing it
merely represents. Saul becomes the state not because he proceeds from
the abstraction (again, God) and is therefore wrought in the image of the
abstraction, but because he proceeds from the attempt to manifest an
abstraction in the image of those who must imagine it (the nation). And
the best that the people can do is create a collective image of themselves.
This is the ultimate parody by the community of its own creation from
23. "And Saul said to unto Samuel: 'I have sinned; for I have transgressed the
commandment of the Lord, and thy words; because I feared the people, and hearkened to
their voice."' I Samuel 15:24.
24. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, supra note 19 (The Four Great Errors
3, id. at 494-495). "He even took the concept of being from the concept of the ego; he
posited 'things' as 'being,' in his image, in accordance with his concept of the ego as a
cause. Small wonder that later he always found in things only that which he hadput into
them. The thing itself, to say it once more, the concept of thing is a mere reflex of the
faith in the ego as cause." Id. at 495.
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out of God (the normative foundation given concrete expression as the
community).25 Yet God rejects this conflation of the leader with the
subject-of authority with power.26  Rather than punish the people
directly, God is satisfied to punish the authority of the people-the
king.27 Thus, caught in the tangle of power and authority not of his own
making, Saul, rather than the nation, is rejected by God for disobedience.
False causation is a self-preservation mechanism. God is the abstraction
of the nation, the nation is the manifestation of that abstraction. These
are the only powers that count. Punishing Saul preserves intact both
kingship and community.21 Saul loses the power of kingship-keeping
only the authority until his death at the hands of his enemies.2 9 Here the
spirit of God, as the power that caused his appointment through a popular
act, ends his kingship through another popular act-the loss of a battle at
the hands of his enemies.
The creation of imaginary causes.3 ° A direct relation between the
people and its God, its communal genius,31 is too unsettling. It is
necessary for Israel to resemble all other nations. But, in turn, all other
nations will also find it easier to resemble Israel, and thus come into the
ultimate, but now removed kingdom of God. Of course, this is the
fundamental principle of Christian success in the pagan world; a pagan
25. "And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created He him;
male and female created He them." Genesis 1:27.
26. "Though thou be little in thine own sight, art thou not the head of the tribes of
Israel?" I Samuel 15:17.
27. "Because thou hast rejected the word of he Lord, He hath also rejected thee from
being king." I Samuel 15:22.
28. "The Lord has rent the kingdom of Israel from thee this day and given it to a
neighbour of thine, that is better than thou. And also the Glory of Israel will not lie nor
repent; for He is not a man that He should repent." I Samuel 15:28-39. This idea is
echoed in some of the writings of the Prophets. "Behold, I am against the shepherds; and
I will require My sheep at their hand, and cause them to cease from feeding the sheep;
neither shall the shepherds feed themselves any more; and I will deliver my sheep from
their mouth, that they may not be food for them." Ezekiel 34:10.
29. "Then he [Saul] said: 'I have sinned; yet honour me now, I pray thee, before the
elders of my people, and before Israel, and return with me, that I may worship the Lord
thy God.' So Samuel returned after Saul; and Saul worshiped the Lord." 1 Samuel 30-
31.
30. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, supra note 19 (The Four Great Errors
4-6, id. at 496-499). "Thus, one searches not only for some kind of explanation to
serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation-that
which has most quickly and most frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new,
hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations. Consequence: one kind of
positing of causes predominates more and more, is concentrated into a system, and finally
emerges as dominant, that is, as simply precluding other causes and explanations." Id. at
497-498.
31. Here genius is used in its ancient sense, as the guardian of a person or people, as
well as in its modem sense, as the manifestation of the guardian spirit of a people (for
example, the genius of France is manifested in its representative institutions).
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success with a Hebrew purpose.32  An abstraction, God, is a hard
master-imitation of others is a gentler God. But such imitation does not
make the imaginary real-it merely blinds the believer.
The error of imaginary causes bedevils the tale of Saul as well. The
people disobeyed God in the matter of the destruction of the Amalekites
because Saul so ordered. The people are easily characterized as helpless,
either as against the king's desire or their own. In one sense, then, they
were the weak instruments of the king. They followed the king's
commands because they must-the king controlled the army. In another
sense they were the weak instruments of their base desire. The people
trusted the king to implement the divine commandments against their
human cravings. The imaginary here centers on the illusion of kingship
for the protection of the community-and its consequences. The people
create in Saul an imagined image of God-as Saul. This imaginary
God-the leader-is comforting. Disobedience of a king was infinitely
less severe an infraction than disobedience of the will of God.33 And
should the consequence of their actions be adverse-the people could
always unmask the king. No longer a stand-in for God, the king could be
transformed into a stand-in for the community, a community, in this case,
that was innocent because they were collectively only following orders.
Saul, after all, and not the people, had transgressed. Thus, the people
profit in both directions. From Saul they secure obedience-because the
power of the community to action resides in the people. From God-the
inescapable normative context of their constitution-the people have
secured a proxy against destruction, for when the community errs, it is
their proxy, the king, who pays in the place of the community.
Illusion based on the error offree will.34 It was a sovereign act of
the national will to appoint a king over Israel. It would require a
32. Even the Church acknowledges this tendency, though for very different effect.
Gregory the Great's famous letter to the Abbot Mellitus, advising that pagan
temples in England be used for the worship of the Christian God that people
'ad loca quae consuevit, familiarius concurrat,' and that the sacrificial animals
of heathenism be now devoted to Christian festivals, agrees with the responsa
of the same pope to Augustine concerning the choosing of local customs best
suited to the conditions of the converted.
William A. Chaney, Paganism to Christianity in Anglo-Saxon England, in EARLY
MEDIEVAL SOCIETY 67 (Sylvia L. Thrupp, ed., 1967).
33. See note 10, above.
34. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, supra note 19 (The Four Great Errors
7-8, id at 499-501). "Today we no longer have any pity for the concept of 'free will':
we know only too well what it really is-the foulest of all theologians' artifices, aimed at
making mankind 'responsible' in their sense, that is, dependent upon them.... The
entire old psychology, the psychology of will, was conditioned by the fact that its
originators, the priests at the head of ancient communities, wanted to create for
themselves the right to punish--or wanted to create this right of God." Id. at 499.
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sovereign act of equal magnitude to remove the king-and end the
kingdom. Thus is created a box within which the people think they can
regulate the king, and their relationship with God. Yet, the bargain made
between the people and God is neither one of freedom nor of will. It is,
instead, a bargain meant to optimize the effectiveness of guilt and
punishment as tools of state governance. 35 "Men were considered 'free'
so that they might be judged and punished-so that they might become
guilty."36 Having demanded the boundaries of a kingship, having carved
authority and responsibility without power into the very body of the
king,37 the nation abandoned their free will to judgment and punishment.
Indeed, in this sense, the very demand of Israel for a king, an act of free
will against God, is better understood inverted-as an act of dependence.
Israel emerges from its fight for a king doubly dependent. Israel is now
dependent on a king-a sovereign who judges and punishes. Israel is
also dependent on a God-who has judged and punished Israel by
granting the nation its wish. In this sense, the community suffers in both
directions, from both the impositions of the king (their corporeal
manifestation) and from that of God (their normative manifestation).
II. Subtext: The Inversions of Miscausation, a Legal Sociology
Just as Israel stood before God, importuning the divine for a king,
the modern world has stood before its divinely infused core principles of
humanity and demanded from them a sovereign. And the post Second
World War world has indeed constructed itself a king worthy of anything
35. "And ye shall cry out in that day because of your king whom ye shall have
chosen you; and the Lord will not answer you in that day." I Samuel 8:18.
36. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, supra note 19 at 499. This notion is
not extraordinary within Christian thought. A very different but not alien notion of the
relationship of free will to sin and guilt can be found in Calvin. See JOHN CALVIN,
INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, Book II, chapter 11 (1559) ("Man Has Now Been
Deprived of Freedom of Choice and Bound Over to Miserable Servitude"), reprinted as
CALVIN: INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION I 255-289 (John T. McNeill, ed., Ford
Lewis Battles, trans., Philadelphia, The Westminister Press, 1975). Here is an
elaboration of an Augustinian idea that
man, using free will badly, has lost both himself and his will. Again, the free
will has been so enslaved that it can have no power for righteousness. Again,
what God's grace has not freed will not be free. Again, the justice of God is
not fulfilled when the law so commands, and man acts as if by his own
strength; but when the Spirit helps, and man's will, no free but freed by God,
obeys.
Id. Bk. II, ch. II, para. 8 (McNeil edition at 1, 265). For the Catholic position, see, e.g.,
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 1730-1748 (English translation, 1994) ("There
is no true freedom except in the service of what is good and just. The choice to disobey
and do evil is an abuse of freedom and leads to 'the slavery of sin."' Id. at 1733; cf.
Rom. 6:17).
37. The notion of the king's body as both physical and symbolic has been deeply
ingrained in Western culture. See E. KANTOROWITZ, THE KING'S Two BODIES (1959).
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from out of the Judeo-Christian Bible. 3' Through this king, this kingship
of the mythic individual as wholly independent hero,39 modem political
communities have embraced the necessity of error in the constitution of
individual authority and communal power. But kingship has assumed a
modem form. It has been reconstituted as the fiihrer principle of
democratic political organization.40 The exercise of sovereign free will
by political communities have continued a conflicting double
dependence-on the 'leader' as the corporeal manifestation of the
political community and on the divine as the manifestation of the
normative constitution of the community. As between communities
around the globe this principle has permeated the very fabric of the
foundational norms of political and legal organization.
As in the Biblical recounting of the elevation of Saul, the modem
form of the errors of the constitution of political communities involves
three actors-the leader, the people, and their norms (sometimes
incarnated as God). Of the three, the leader is given pride of place-she
is easy to identify, the body on which misdirection can be concentrated.
Scholars certainly tend to gaze at leaders, at the king, like the readers of
38. As an aside, I note but reject the notion that "Judeo-Christianity" is some sort of
malformed artificial construct made out of the irreconcilable and mutually antagonistic.
It is true enough that there is no "Judeo-Christian" faith community as such, but the
connection between the holy books of the various incarnations of Judaism and of
Christianity is difficult to ignore even if the nature and character of that connection is
disputed. It is to that connection, and connection in a cultural rather than a primarily faith
sense, that I refer. It follows, of course, that I do not mean by this reference to value any
such characterization of connection over others.
39. The type of the hero is not limited to Judeo-Christian holy texts. For an
examination of the hero as a foundational cultural type, see, e.g., JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE
HERO WITH A THOUSAND FACES (Princeton University Press, 2" ed., 1968).
40. For a discussion of the use of the term fiihrer principle in this article, see, note
21, supra. While the term is used principally in connection with the development of a
peculiar template for international human rights law, I use it here to reference, with some
irony, the development of a related principle which forms part of the core of foundational
rules of democratic political organization. The West no longer vests the sovereign
authority in a king -- instead, the kingly power is vested in a leader who can be
denominated president, or premier or prime minister, it doesn't really matter. Thus, rather
than anointing a king as the embodiment of the divine, modern communities elect a
president as an embodiment of the whole community. From a conservative perspective,
there may be little difference between the ancient and modern forms.
Traced to this source, the voice of a people -- uttered under the
necessity of avoiding the greatest of calamities, through the organs of
a government so constructed as to suppress the expression of all
partial and selfish interests, and to give a full and faithful utterance to
the sense of the whole community, in reference to its common
welfare -- may, with impiety, be called the voice of God.
John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government, in JOHN C. CALHOUN, UNIONAND
LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 5, 31 (Ross M. Lence, ed.,
1992) (1850).
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romance novels focus on the hero. 41  The king, priest, legislator-
leader-is a type that embodies the post-modernist insights into the
nature of the striving for power, personal power from out of attributes of
class, race, status, caste, religion, or membership in some other
community. Modernity is, in a sense, a wrestling with, and perhaps an
embrace of, the elaboration of a fiihrer principle in theorizing. The
success of the leader type through the millennia has given religion,42 and
political organization43 its particular character.
The leader (as priest, king, president, legislator, or tyrant) is
permitted to maintain her hegemony of authority within a community
through deployment of the four great rules of mis-causation. 44 "Every
single sentence which religion and morality formulate contains it: priests
and legislators of moral codes are the originators of this corruption of
41. Professor Alvarez expresses the general understanding when he notes, in a
different context:
There is also widespread consensus among international lawyers that the flaws
of prior proceedings at Nuremberg and Tokyo have been largely corrected and
that the new ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are more
credible instruments of the international community in terms of their respective
bases of jurisdiction, rules and procedures, bench, and bar. To date, most
international lawyers regard proceedings within these ad hoc tribunals as more
attractive than available alternatives and few criticize the jurisdictional primacy
these entities enjoy. International lawyers' emphasis on international fora has
also been accompanied by clear preferences as to whom to indict. From the
outset, most international lawyers have argued that the scarce resources of the
international community need to be devoted to trying those perpetrators who
have the greatest responsibility, by which they mean the leaders and instigators,
at a high policy level, of mass atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and in
Rwanda.
Jos6 E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons Form Rwanda, 24 YALE J.
INT'L L. 365, 377 (1999).
42. Nietzsche was particularly good at attempting a demonstration, through the
example of the construction of modern Christianity. See, especially, Friedrich Nietzsche,
The Antichrist, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 568 (Walter Kaufmann, trans., Viking Press,
1972) (DER ANTICHRIST, 1895) at 39 et seq.
43. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (William Ellis, trans., London Everyman's Library,
J.M. Dutton, 1912). Aristotle, of course, suggests that government must be organized in
accordance with the tastes, character, and habits of the people who are worthy of
citizenship. But not all people are by nature, character, or birth worthy of citizenship.
And not all citizens are always worthy of sharing in the honors of governance. "There
must therefore necessarily be as many different forms of governments as there are
different ranks in the society, arising from the superiority of some over others, and their
different situations." Id. at 110. In an interesting comment, Aristotle suggests that, even
democratic communities must, from time to time, suffer the leadership of the few: "But
whenever a whole family or any one of another shall happen to so far exceed in virtue as
to exceed all others persons in the community, then it is fight that the kingly power
should be in them ... for it is contrary to nature that what is highest should ever be
lowest." Id., at 104. On the constitution of worthiness, see ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS (Martin Oswald, trans., Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1962).
44. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, supra note 19, at 499.
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reason." 45 In the hands of the leader, the great errors of miscausation
describe and predict the manner in which the socio-political priestly
caste, the king and his minions, relate to and operate within the
community over which it seeks to preserve their authority.
Communities-the nation-state, religious communities, terrorist
organizations-are arranged through the cultivation of these errors of
causation by the leader. Nietzsche thus provides us with an insight of
how, from the perspective of the leader-of Saul-the cultivation of
errors of causation can be dangerous for a community. Miscausation
creates the illusion of power where there is only authority. It provides a
basis for the seduction of a community by its leader.
The cultivation of the leader through the inversions of miscausation
can be dangerous for a community, especially for one theorized as
essentially passive. Yet, the cultivation of miscausation can also serve a
community well. Nietzsche again provides insight. In this case that
insight suggests that the inversions so useful to the leader's authority
serve the power of the community in equal measure.46 Shifting one's
gaze from Saul to Israel-from the leader to the nation-provides a basis
for removing a veil cloaking the place where power resides. The forms
of miscausation that preserve the authority of the leader, that create the
illusion of power centered on the leader, also undergird the power of the
community from both its leader and the normative foundations of the
community nations (our modem global deity). This normative
foundation currently finds expression in the human rights norms that
have come to dominate systems of behavior codes between nations.
The story of Saul and Israel is the story of the modem world,
written not in a slim passage of an ancient text, but in a multi-layered
system of law and custom that applies with increasingly coercive force to
all political communities on the globe. The priest, the legislator, the
leader does not usurp dominion over the herd. Rather, the herd, for its
own preservation as a herd, demands the overlordship of the leader.
Here is Negri's post-modem horde, inverted to reveal the sheep
managing the wolves.47 The ftihrer principle, the leader-dominance
model that forms the core of global political organization, thus serves to
hide, behind its miscausations, the realities of the relationship between
people-communities-and their leaders. In this instance, the errors of
causation-mistaking cause for effects, false causality, imagined
causality and the assumption of free will-serve to protect the power of
45. Id. at 492.
46. Id. at 26-26.
47. See MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (Harvard U. Press, 2000) ("A
new nomad horde, a new race of barbarians, will arise to invade or evacuate Empire." Id.
at 213).
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the political community by perverting the principle of individual
responsibility for unlawful acts.
Thus understood, the contribution of the fiihrer principle to the
construction of the great human rights law edifice of the second half of
the 201h century becomes clearer. The flihrer principle exalts the
individual as both dependent and independent actor within national and
international law theory. 48  The idea of the individual, as dependent
actor, has led to the application of the fiihrer principle in the production
of emerging global principles of human rights, spreading a cloak of
protection around communities of individuals for communal acts. 49 The
individual, as independent actor, has given rise to a cult of individual
responsibility for political acts,50 the responsibility for which once rested
with the political community in whose names the acts were perpetrated.5'
48. Note the potential circularity of the Jtihrer principle in this context. "This
principle linked individuals to the will of the leader, who was a crystallization of the will
of the group he represented." Hugh T. Scogin, Jr., Withdrawal and Expulsion in
Germany. a Comparative Perspective on the "Close Corporation Problem" 15 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 127, 150 & N. 86 (1993) citing to ENTWURF DES REICHSJUSTIZMINISTERIUMS ZU
EINEM GESETZ UBER GESELLSCHAFTEN MIT BESCHRANKTER HAFTUNG VON 1939, at 35-69
(Werner Schubert ed., 58th ed. 1985). The leader is the embodiment of individual will-
he is a dependent actor-but only he can discern the collective will, and in this sense is
the only active actor. The people can share in the benefits brought by the leader-she is
only implementing their collective will (the purest form of democratic action), but can
also distinguish themselves from the leader-an individual among individuals-when the
community is called to task for its actions.
49. The great international treaties on the conduct of war between communities
makes a great distinction between civilians and combatants. Civilians are defined as all
individuals other than combatants. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, at art. 4.a.1-3, 4.a.6; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, at Arts. 43, 50. During conflict, the civilian population
may not be the object of attack. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted June 8, 1977, entered into force Dec. 7, 1978, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3-608 ("Additional Protocol I") at art. 48. The United States is not a signatory
to the 1977 Protocol.
50. Modem international law defines combatants as members of all organized
groups under a command that is responsible for the conduct of the combatants. Geneva
Convention on definition of combatants-their exposure and their protection (due process
in combat situations). See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, at art. 4.a. 1-3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict,
June 8, 1977, at Arts. 43, 50.
51. Warfare in ancient times assumed the investment of the community involved.
Consider the nature of combat among the Greeks and Romans before Christianity. Nature
of action was by people at the behest of the Gods. For the losing population, the
consequence of loss was usually death or slavery. Thus, for example, Thucydidies
recounts the fate of the Melians after their defeat by Athens during the Peloponnesian
War. The "Melians surrendered at discretion to the Athenians, who put to death all the
grown men whom they took, and sold the women and children for slaves, and
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Indeed, the thrust of the modem constituent organization of conflict
requires the creation of systems of hierarchy around which group action
is to be organized. The purpose is to force organization that focuses on
individual action in the context of communal action.52 The most
spectacular recent example of this cult of personal responsibility for
atrocious communal acts has been the movement towards limited
personal responsibility for acts of genocide and other crimes against
humanity 53 originating with the Nurenberg prosecutions at the Second
World War and continuing into the 2 1st Century with the prosecution of
subsequently sent out five hundred colonists and inhabited the place themselves."
THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 337 (Crowley, trans., Modem Library edition,
1951) (411 B.C.E.?). Mongol combat followed a similar pattern-for instance, the
invasion of Baghdad in 1256. As recounted in Muslim histories of the time, the Mongols
beheaded the elite of the city, trampled the last 'Abbasid Caliph and then murdered a
good part of the population of the City. See REYNOLD A. NICHOLSON, A LITERARY
HISTORY OF THE ARABS 444-447 (1969).
52. The rules of conflict are imposed on combatants, as individuals. Commission of
crimes are individual events which fall on the lowest status individual combatant
committing the act, and then up the chain of command to the highest military and
political level where responsibility for oversight or command may be lodged. See, e.g.,
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, at Arts. 43.1, 44.1
(stating that the "armed forces of a Party ... shall be subject to an internal disciplinary
system which.., shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law," and "any
combatant.., who falls into the power of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner of war").
53. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, at Art. 33; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, at Art. 87; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, at Arts. 75.2.d. The modem general understanding is well
articulated by one of the foremost non-governmental humanitarian groups of the early
2l1 s century, Mrdecins Sans Fronti~res:
International law posits that no person may be punished for acts that he or she
did not commit. It ensures that the collective punishment of a group of persons
for a crime committed by an individual is forbidden.... This is one of the
fundamental guarantees established by the Geneva Conventions and their
protocols. This guarantee is applicable not only to protected persons but to all
individuals, no matter what their status, or to what category of persons they
belong....
FRANQOISE BOUCHET-SAULINIER, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HUMANITARIAN LAW (Laura
Brav, ed. & trans., Rowan & Littlefield Pub., 2002). Individual responsibility becomes
possible when acts taken in the course of communal conflict are reduced to crimes, in the
context in which there is general agreement that crimes may only be committed by
individuals. Individual liability becomes workable as a something other than a concept
when communities agree to organize their conflict on the basis of distinctions between
combatants and non-combatants and to organize their combatants through strict chains of
command. In a world generally organized for conflict alone these lines, a community,
like a corporation, cannot commit a crime. Or, put a different way, only individuals
involved in the acts ascribed to the community--or the corporation-may be punished.
See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violators of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991).
2003]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
the former leader of the Yugoslav federation for genocide.54 The
accusation of a man and his minions, Osama bin Laden and his advisors,
for the attack on New York and Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001
has sharply focused this understanding. Thomas Franck recently
reported on a conference in Europe in which the Americans were roundly
criticized for violating the miscaused rules of personal responsibility and
the sanctity of the community from which those acts sprang.
55
The construction of this legal edifice of rights thus veils and
protects power in a world of communal conflict. The methodology of
this veiling is inversion. Inversion in this sense points to reversals and
transpositions, focused to produce specific socio-political results.
Inversion is the product of the miscausation identified by Nietzsche and
so amply demonstrated in the apocryphal Biblical tale of Saul. Inversion
reminds us that when searching for power within the matrix of
communal behavior, it is best to turn one's gaze away from the leader.
As in the animal world, the brightest plumage does not necessarily
indicate the most important object.
In the modem world, four great inversions of authority and power
have been produced out of the miscausation suggested by Nietzsche.
These inversions dominate much of the law that regulates and protects
the constitution of political communities in the modem world. These
inversions evidence the extent to which the modem world has transposed
the story of the Biblical Saul into the language of law. Those teaching
not only serve to construct the rules we use with respect to community,
but also veil the edifice of rights and protections the rules construct. The
54. There is a mountain of writing on personal responsibility for atrocious
communal acts. See, e.g., CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1992, The Hague: Matinus Nijhoff); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling
Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violators of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE
LJ. 2537 (1991); John Dugard, Reconciliation and Justice: The South African
Experience, 8 TRANSNAT'L & CONTEMP. PROBS. 277 (1998).
55. The following propositions were assayed to demonstrate the alleged
illegality of U.S. recourse to force: ... (1) It violates the Article 2(4) of the
Charter prohibition against the use of force except when authorized by the
Security Council.... (2) Self-Defense is impermissible after an attack has
ended; that is, after September 11, 2001 .... (3) Self-defense may be exercised
only against an attack by a state. Al Qaeda is not the government of a state....
(4) Self-defense may be exercised only against an actual attacker. The Taliban
are not the attacker .... (5) Self-Defense may be exercised only "until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security.". . . (6) The right to self-defense arises only upon proof that it is
being directed against the actual attacker....
Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 AM.i. INT'L L. 839
(2001) (referring to the Symposium, The United States and International Law-The
Effects of U.S. Predominance on the Foundations of International Law, GOttingen (Oct.
25-27, 2001).
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cult of the leader, the solicitude for the powerless sheep hide a very
different reality. That reality defines the boundaries of the inversions of
political organization.
A. The first inversion: communities are protected not because they are
weak, but because they are strong.
Law protects community against the apparatus of the state and its
leaders because the community is weak-unarmed, unable to defend
itself. Thus the law of war and of humanitarian aid posits a world of
strong leaders backed by effective coercive mechanisms of state power
56
and of weak civilian populations. 57  The community is important to a
leader because of the value it represents-in terms of people and wealth.
From the leader's perspective, the community is a flock of sheep-weak,
docile, valuable. 58  Thus, from the conventional perspective, the
individuals comprising the political community are protected, in law and
custom, because, as against the leader they do not count. Populations,
like herds of sheep, are protected because they are useful. Populations
are a source of wealth, of production, for the elites. People are a
resource with respect to which leaders, the elites, fight to control. In this
sense, the rise of human rights law can be understood as a method by
which sheep protect themselves because of their productive value.
Because the community as discrete individuals doesn't count, it deserves
protection. Malthus understood this.59 This understanding accounts in
56. These include armies, money, bureaucracy, authority; see generally Sohail
Inayatullah, Proutworld, UN Futures and Structural Possibilities of World Governance:
World Government, Globalization and UN Reform, (1999), at
http://www.proutworld.org/ideology/leadership/futunandwg.htm (last visited April 25,
2003).
57. Weakness here in the sense of the absence of any of the coercive powers of a
state apparatus. Clearly, weakness is not uniform. See, e.g., Mariano Aguirre, Silence
over Chechnya, 4 THE PROGRESSIVE RESPONSE 9 (Mar. 7, 2000), available at
http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/ progresp/ volume4/ v4 n09_ body.html (last
visited April 25, 2003).
58. See Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in
International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S115 (Jan.
2002); see also Jack Goldsmith, Book Review: Sovereignty, International Relations
Theory, and International Law: Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, 52 STAN. L. REV.
959, 963-964, 971 (April 2000) and Wiktor Osiatynski, Human Rights for the 21"
Century, St. Louis-Warsaw Trans'l 29, 46-47 (2000).
59. Amartya Sen, Fertility and Coercion, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1035 (Summer 1996)
(citing Thomas Robert Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, E. Wrigley &
D. Souden eds. 1986 (1st ed. 1798). Malthus set forth the population theory and became
England's first professor of political economy in 1806 at East India College. Herbert
Hovencamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REv. 379,
405 (Jan. 1988). Malthus' conclusions drew two conclusions: 1) Population, when
unchecked, will grow geometrically; and 2) Once all good land has been put into
production, the food supply can grow, at best, arithmetically. Malthus' observations had
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part for the nature of population planning of the "great powers" of the
1 9th century as well as of the Soviet state, that sought to increase
population for power-production, armies, emigration. 60  Today the
poorer countries most valuable resource is the people it can send
abroad.6'
Yet, the community of aggregate individuals does count. Inverting
traditional understandings produces a clearer reality-law protects the
political community because it is strong. Political communities have had
written into the international law of inter-communal conflict a series of
protections in its favor against their own leaders. The wealth of
communities is the community itself, as a (to use the language of
business) a going concern. Leaders, in a sense, are either parasites, or
tools useful for the deployment of the coercive power of the
community-God's description of the nature of the practices of kings is
revealing in this light.62  In an older world, where leaders were
understood to serve as instruments of a community, communities along
with their leaders, paid in intra-communal conflicts. 63 In the extreme
case, communities faced annihilation in fact. Indeed, there is a long
tradition in the Middle East, known to the West since the campaigns of
Alexander the Great, for communities resisting an attacking army to
suffer the death of the adult males and the selling into slavery of the
women and children. 64 Here sociology, law and politics provides the
foundational subtext to the narrative of the Biblical tale of Saul. God
profound implications for Britain, which was heavily developed at the time of his theory.
Id.
60. See generally Lee S. Wolosky, Jonathan M. Malis, and David A. Schwimmer,
Recent Development: Start, Start II, and Ownership of Nuclear Weapons: The Case for a
"Primary" Successor State, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 581 (Spring 1993).
61. See, e.g., Frederick G. Whelan, Strangers to the Constitution: Immigrants in
American Law: Principles of U.S. Immigration Policy, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 447, 483-484
(Winter 1983). The author argues that "[T]he provision of opportunities for migration
(temporary or permanent) may be seen as an alternative to economic growth in the poor
country... The admission of immigrants from poor countries into a rich country such as
the United States, which gives them access to resources, is the economic equivalent of
redistributing the resources from here to there." Id.
62. 1 Samuel 8:11-18.
63. Cf Henry J. Richardson, Ill, "Failed States, " Self-Determination, and
Preventive Diplomacy: Colonialist Nostalgia and Democratic Expectations, 10 TEMP.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1, 58 (Spring 1996); see also Michel Rosenfeld, Can Human Rights
Bridge the Gap between Universalism and Cultural Relativism? A Pluralist Assessment
Based on the Rights of Minorities, 30 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 249 (Spring 1999).
64. See, e.g., ARRIAN, THE CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER (Aubrey de S~incourt, trans.,
Penguin Books, rev. ed., 1971). Arrian describes how Alexander sold into slavery
everyone taken after the capture of Tyre (though other accounts mention the crucifixion
of 2,000 men as well. Id. at 143. In the course of the subsequent capture of Gaza, most
of the adult male defenders were killed and the women and children sold into slavery. Id.
at 147.
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rejected Saul when he did nothing to prevent the transgressions of the
people. But God never rejected the people.
B. The second inversion: the community is not dependent on the
leader, the leader is dependent on the community.
The republican principle, participatory democracy, suggests an
interaction among individuals. The leader represents the aggregate of a
majority of individual atomistic decisions.65 Because democratic action
is atomistic and the electorate apathetic and manageable, leaders, as
managers of the governance structure of the political community, tend to
control the electoral process.66 Even if a democratic state is a function of
the interaction of sub-communal factions, 67 or interest groups, 68 the
65. For a standard version of the classic theory, see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The
Republican Civic Tradition: Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539-41 (July
1988).
66. This theory is well developed in American corporate law. See MARK J. ROE,
STRONG MANAGERS AND WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF THE SEPARATION OF
OWNERSHIP FROM CONTROL (1994); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The
Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1277, 1281-89 (1991).
See, also, Alexander G. Simpson, Shareholder Voting and the Chicago School: Now is
the Winter of our Discontent, 43 DUKE LJ. 189, 215-16 (1993) (in the area of shareholder
democracy, the current system forces firms into a single, largely republican mold); see
also, Patrick B. Griffin, The Delaware Effect: Keeping the Tiger in its Cage, The
European Experience of Mutual Recognition in Financial Services, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
337, 339 (citing William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (suggesting that Delaware's corporate law works in
favor of management and against shareholders. This bias, according to Cary, stems from
the reality that management, not shareholders, make critical decisions). But the notion
has application in modem political theory as well. This may provide a useful way of
understanding the way the American presidential election of 2000 was decided as
between the electorate and judiciary. In a sense, the electorate served as the equivalent of
corporate weak owners, and the judiciary served the interests of the strong managers-
the competing organizations of the national political parties. Moreover, just as corporate
managers tend to control the electoral process in the sense that managers' choices for
board membership tend to be elected, see Edward B. Block, The Logic and (Uncertain)
Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEORGETOWN L.J. 445 (1991), so
do incumbents and the established political parties have a significant advantage in
electoral campaigns. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (defining republican
principles as those that promote the general welfare of the community as a whole by
treating every person equally and guarding each individual person's rights. Republican
principles are not, according to Madison, "the force of government used to conform all its
citizens into one common mold with the same opinions, passions, and interests ... ").
67. THE FEDERALIST No. 14 (James Madison) (describing the Union as the "antidote
for the diseases of faction, which have proved fatal to ... popular governments").
68. For an insightful description of the individual versus group conflict theories of
democratic organization in a labor context, see, Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to
Individual Liberties: Post-War Labor Law, Liberalism, and the Waning of Union
Strength, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (1999) (examining the history of interest-
group pluralism industrial pluralism and its impact on labor law).
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leader emerges as essentially independent of the polity that elected him. 69
Inverted, a more realistic view emerges. The leader is a singularity, the
community an aggregate. The authority of the leader springs from her
position relative to the conflict of democratic sovereignty. 70 Democracy,
then, is better understood as
a concept of participation that is linked to the vitality of a population
and to its capacity to generate a dialectic of counterpowers-a
concept, therefore, that has little to do with the classical or the
modem concept of democracy. Even the reigns of Genghis Khan and
Tamerlane were from this perspective somewhat 'democratic,' as
were Caesar's legions, Napoleon's armies, and the armies of Stalin
and Eisenhower, since each of them enabled the participation of a
population that supported its expansive action.
71
The leader is dependent on the community; the leader acts in conformity
to the wishes of the people. The leader acts against the preferences of
the people at his peril. Saul risked the wrath of God rather than
countermand the people. The preferences of the people may be
expressed by the actions of the mob,72 the votes of the electorate,73 the
69. In one sense, in elections by simple majority, the leader needs the votes, or the
support, of a bare majority. For the others, the leader can represent tyranny. This notion
underlies the once controversial idea of the concurrent majority in 19 th century Southern
political theory. See John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government, in UNION AND
LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 35-39 (Ross M. Lence ed.,
1992).
70. See MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (Harvard U. Press, 2000) ("the
social base of this democratic sovereignty is always confictual. Power is organized
through the emergence and interplay of the counterpowers. The city is thus a constituent
power that is formed through plural social conflicts articulated in continuous
constitutional processes." Id. at 162).
71. MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 373 (Harvard U. Press, 2000).
72. Consider the role of the crowd in symbolic acts, like the fall of the wall
separating East from West Berlin. See e.g. Heiko Koo, 12 Years After the Berlin Wall
Fell-November 9, 1989: An Eye-witness Account, (2001) at
http://www.marxist.com/Europeberlinwall.htm; BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICANS (1998),
http://www.ds.state.gov/about/publications/terrorism/pvaa1998-low.pdf, Mob Trashes
Iraqi Embassy in Iran, (Apr. 11, 2003) at -
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/04/1 1/iraq/main548829.html.
73. See generally, David B. Magleby, Legislatures and the Initiative: The Politics of
Direct Democracy, 59 J. ST. GOV'T 31 (1986); Voting Makes a Difference, at
http://cltr.co.douglas.nv.us/Elections/HistoryatWork.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2003)
(noting that in 1800 Thomas Jefferson was elected President by one vote in the House of
Representatives after a tie in the electoral college; in 1824 Andrew Jackson won the
presidential popular vote but lost by one vote in the House of Representatives to John
Quincy Adams after an electoral college dead-lock; in 1876-Samuel Tilden won the
presidential popular vote but came up one electoral vote shy and lost to Rutherford B.
Hayes).
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articulations of opinion polls, 74 the reportage in the popular press, 75 or
the economic decisions of consumers and investors.76
The expression of that power may be cyclical-a cycling between
explosions of the masses and consolidations of those explosions in ever
narrower circles of authority, 77 or between vigor and decadence.78  In
modem cultures the expression of the popular will may be constituted-
through a process of formal plebiscite or referendum.79 Yet the
74. See generally Yonkel Goldstein, The Failure of Constitutional Controls Over
War Powers in the Nuclear Age: The Argument for a Constitutional Amendment, 40
STAN. L. REV. 1543, 1566-68 (1988) (stating that the empirical data from the Vietnam
and Korean Wars supports the proposition that public opinion poll data influences policy
decisions); DIANA C. MUTZ, IMPERSONAL INFLUENCE: How PERCEPTIONS OF MASS
COLLECTIVES AFFECT POLITICAL ATTITUDES (1998).
75. In any given election, one has only to turn to newspapers, magazines, or internet
sites to read or view reports of the preferences of the general public. The influence of the
popular press, whether in the form of print, or increasingly, visual media, cannot be
underestimated. See generally KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON & PAUL WALDEMAN, THE
PRESS EFFECT: POLITICIANS, JOURNALISTS, AND THE STORIES THAT SHAPE THE POLITICAL
WORLD (Oxford University Press, 2002).
76. See e.g., Co-op America's Boycott Organizer's Guide at
http://www.coopamerica.org/boycotts/boycott-organizer-guide.pdf (last visited April 26,
2003) (defining boycotts as "marketplace democracy in action-consumers voting with
their dollars for social and economic change").
77. See ANTONIO NEGRI, INSURGENCIES: CONSTITUENT POWER AND THE MODERN
STATE (Maurizia Boscgli, trans., Univ. Minnesota Press, 1999) (on the conflict between
constituent power, the active operative element of popular political expression, and
constituted power, the articulations of formalized organizations of a representative
exercise of power through rules and law).
78. The classic statement of the historiography of decadence in political governance
was articulated by 'ABD-AR RACHMAN IBN KHALDUN, THE MUQADDIMAH: AN
INTRODUCTION TO HISTORY (Franz Rosenthal, trans., N.J. Dawood, ed., 1967) (1377)
(Muqaddimah (Introduction) to Kitdb al- 'Ibar (Book of the History of the World) at 97-
119.
79. The referendum process in the United States has served as both a powerful
element of popular expression in certain states, such as California, and as a means of
subverting the will of the representative authorities. For a discussion in the American
context, see, e.g., Jerry W. Calvert, The Popular Referendum Device and Equality of
Voting Rights-How Minority Suspension of the Laws Subverts "One Person-One Vote"
In the States, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 383 (1997). See also, David B. Magleby,
Legislatures and the Initiative: The Politics of Direct Democracy, 59 J. ST. GOv'T 31
(1986). In Europe, plebiscites play a crucial role in the constitution of the European
Union. The negative vote of the Irish people in connection with the recently drafted
Treaty of Nice provides a powerful example. See, e.g., Kevin Connolly (BBC News),
Nice Treaty Set for Irish Verdict, Nov. 5, 2001, available at
http://c2d.unige.ch/news/rel.php?rel=1317&lang = (Ireland is the only EU member state
conducting a referendum on the Treaty of Nice); Michael Roddy, Irish Reject Nice Treaty
in Blow to EU Expansion (Reuters), June 8, 2001, available at
http://c2d.unige.ch/news/rel.php?rel= I 335&lang= (Ireland's Constitution, vesting
sovereignty in the people, requires that the treaty be ratified by referendum; since the
treaty required ratification by all 15 EU members, the Irish people effectively blocked the
enlargement of the EU. Turnout was low with only 32% of the electorate voting, 54% of
them voting against the Nice Treaty). The voice of the Irish people spoke again on
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expression of the popular will in modern times can as well be violent.
The transformation of socialist Eastern Europe in the late 1980s provides
a dramatic example.8°
In older cultures, the expressions of the popular will was more
crude, and perhaps more direct. The democracy of the late Roman
Republic provides stark illustration of this principle. 81 Electoral politics
was a function of bribery, agreement between candidates, and violence.
Legislation, especially legislation in the popular assemblies, was marked
by violent communal action.82 The careers of P. Clodius Pulcher83 and
October 19, 2002: see Michael Roddy, Irish say "yes" to EU enlargement (Reuters), Oct.
20, 2002, http://c2d.unige.ch/news/rel.php?rel=1665&lang= (in a turnout of 49.47% of
the electorate, voting 62.8% to 37.11%, the Irish people voted to ratify the EU pact that
14 other member states had already approved). Earlier iterations of fundamental changes
to the structure of the European Union had also been subject to the power of the
plebiscite, for example the Danish rejection of the Treaty of European Union in the early
1990s. For a discussion of plebiscites in Europe generally, see Nicolai Ronnebek
Hinrichsen, Note, The Constitutional Objection to European Union Membership: A
Challenge for the Danish Supreme Court, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 571; see also Protocol on
the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty
establishing the European Community, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/accessible/treaties/en/livre3 17.htm. For a general discussion of plebiscites in
Europe, see generally, Michael Gallagher, Electoral Systems: Referendums and
Plebiscites, at http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/esc0Ia.htm (last modified Nov.
2, 2001).
80. See generally, EASTERN EUROPE IN REVOLUTION (Ivo Banac, ed., 1992). With
respect to specific countries, see generally, Todorova, Improbable Maverich or Typical
Conformist? Seven Thoughts on the New Bulgaria, in EASTERN EUROPE IN REVOLUTION,
149-50 (Ivo Banac ed., 1992); Katherine Verdery & Gail Kligman, Romania after
Ceausescu: Post- Communist Communism?, in EASTERN EUROPE IN REVOLUTION 130,
(Ivo Banac ed., 1992); Jan Gross, Poland: from Civil Society to Political Nation, in
EASTERN EUROPE IN REVOLUTION 60; Judt, Metamorphosis: the Democratic Revolution in
Czechoslovakia, in EASTERN EUROPE IN REVOLUTION, 96-99. See also "Protests Mark
Launch of New Romanian Party," REUTERS, Nov. 19, 1990, available in LEXIS,
NEXIS Library, Reuters File, and Anna Gelpern, The Laws and Politics of
Reprivatization in East-Central Europe: A Comparison, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L 315.
81. It is no answer to the analogy drawn here that the Roman Republic is both long
gone and represents a culture with no current expression. Modem scholarship has
demonstrated the continuities of culture from the time of the founding of the civilizations
of the Mediterranean and modem European culture. See, e.g., MICHAEL GRANT, THE
COLLAPSE AND RECOVERY OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE (Routledge, 1999).
82. Drawing from the original sources Lily Ross Taylor concludes that:
Many of the irregularities familiar from the electoral assemblies were known in
the legislative assemblies, but generally intimidation of voters and violence
were far more common here than bribery. The public meetings in which rival
orators addressed the people on new laws were frequently disorderly, and both
sides began going to the meetings accompanied by armed thugs and
gladiators.... [C]lashes between armed bands were common on the city street,
in public meetings, and even while voting was in progress.
LILY Ross TAYLOR, PARTY POLITICS IN THE AGE OF CAESAR 74 (Univ. Of Calif. Press,
1949).
83. Clodius, a member of the Roman nobility, later adopted into a plebeian family in
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T. Annius Milo 84 provide an instructive example of a democracy of the
mob.85 Though the mob warfare of Clodius and Milo was extreme, the
expression of the popular will through acts of violence or intimidation
had been and remained part of the fabric of Roman political life.1
6
Thereafter, it was for the triumvirs themselves, and thereafter the
emperors, to seek the favor of the mob directly,87 or to face the mob.s
order for him to stand for the office of tribune, as a youth had been at the center of a great
scandal that resulted in the divorce by Julius Caesar of his wife. Disguised as a woman,
Clodius had secreted himself into the house of Caesar, where the rituals of the Bona Dea,
forbidden to men, was being performed. Clodius was acquitted of the charge of sacrilege
after a trial more remembered for the ostentatiousness of the bribery than for its merits,
and Caesar divorced his wife Pompeia on the grounds that any wife of his must remain
above suspicion. For the story, see Plutarch, The Life of Cicero, in PLUTARCH, FALL OF
THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 311, 338-340 (Rex Warner, trans., Penguin Books, 1958) (before
120); see generally H. H. SCULLARD, FROM THE GRACCHI TO NERO: A HISTORY OF ROME
133 BC ToAD 68 1 16 ( 3 rd ed., Methuen & Co., 1970).
84. An individual in the service of Pompey to organize a gang to counter the effects
of Clodius in Roman political life of the 50s BC. See H. H. SCULLARD, FROM THE
GRACCHI TO NERO: A HISTORY OF ROME 133 BC TOAD 68 121 ( 3 rd ed., Methuen & Co.,
1970).
85. Clodius revived the right of people to associate in groups, the collegia. These
were associations of the poorer men of a city organized around a cult or a trade and
serving primarily for mutual aid-principally burial. See, e.g., LILY Ross TAYLOR,
PARTY POLITICS IN THE AGE OF CAESAR 43 (Univ. Of Calif. Press, 1949) (The collegia
were used in politics to terrorize opponents. Id. at 45). Clodius then "organized a
number of the poorer classes into political clubs, and he provided himself with a
bodyguard of armed slaves." Plutarch, The Life of Cicero, in PLUTARCH, FALL OF THE
ROMAN REPUBLIC 311, 340-41 (Rex Warner, trans., Penguin Books, 1958) (before 120).
These Clodius put at the disposal of the First Triumvirate. Eventually Clodius turned on
Pompey, who managed, in Milo, to find a counter to Clodius. Politics in the 50s BC was
reduced to armed conflict within Rome in parallel with the running of the ordinary
institutions of the state-the Senate and the law courts. Eventually Milo's followers
managed to kill Clodius, and Milo, condemned for the murder despite a defense by
Cicero, was exiled. Much of this is recounted in Plutarch, The Life of Cicero, in
PLUTARCH, FALL OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 311, 340-347 (Rex Warner, trans., Penguin
Books, 1958) (before 120). About 80 years before these events, in 133 BC, two tribunes,
the Gracchi, were murdered in the course of a campaign for a reform of the agrarian laws
in violence that for some marks the start of the turbulence leading to the end of the
Roman Republic. On Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, see Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus and
Gaius Gracchus, in PLUTARCH, THE MAKERS OF ROME 154-193 (Ian Scott-Kilvert, trans.,
Penguin Books 1965) (before 120).
86. "In the fifties the gangs of Clodius, recruited from the guilds [collegia] of the
urban plebs, and the rival thugs of the optimates' man Milo, probably drawn from the
country people, kept the city in constant uproar. Even more effective than such private
armed forces were the experienced soldiers and veterans of the great commanders.
Frequently, their presence was enough to turn the voting into a sham and a mockery."
LILY Ross TAYLOR, PARTY POLITICS IN THE AGE OF CAESAR 74 (Univ. Of Calif. Press,
1949).
87. Though Caesar was quick to suppress the collegia that had served him well
under Clodius. See H. H. SCULLARD, FROM THE GRACCHI TO NERO: A HISTORY OF ROME
133 BC To AD 68 148 ( 3 rd ed., Methuen & Co., 1970).
88. NERO SALLUST, TACITUS.
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Eventually, the gangs of the Late Republic gave way to the circus
factions of the Imperial period. A sense of the old knowledge of these
mob parties survives in distorted form to this day.89 Byzantine state
politics seemed also dependent not on a blind obedience to the imperial
power (except by those closest to the imperial household) but rather on
the ability to maintain the goodwill of Constantinople's organized
mobs. 90 Thus, although the histories are written to suggest imperial
leadership and manipulation of mobs, it is as easy to posit mob control
and manipulation of an imperial household anxious to maintain their
position and always in need of the resources necessary to maintain the
state. 91
C. The third inversion.: the leader serves as proxy for the community;
the doctrine ofpersonal responsibility for communal acts protects a
community by sacrificing its leaders for acts of communal wrongs.
The first and second inversions produce irony. The theory of
individual responsibility, even for communal acts, is grounded, in
substantial part, on the idea that leaders are strong and the polity weak
(first inversion) and that leaders have a freedom of decision independent
89. The movie Gladiator made much of the power of the circus parties in the ability
of the Emperor to retain power. See GLADIATOR (Dreamworks 2000).
90. Modem Scholars have come around to the view that the political parties of the
early Byzantine Empire, the demes, were significantly more important than mere sporting
associations. Found throughout the big cities of the Empire, their organization provided
militia for the defense of the city and the nucleus through which the population arranged
themselves politically. Whatever the authority of the Imperial household, action was
impossible without taking into account the reaction of the Blues and the Greens.
The antagonism between the two factions showed itself in severe and frequent
clashes, and from the mid-fifth century the political life of the Empire was
marked by a perpetual struggle between the Blues and the Greens. The central
authority was forced to take the demes into account in its policy, favouring
either one or the other, so that as a rule one faction would support the
government while the other joined the opposition. At times both demes made
common cause against imperial rule in order to defend their liberties against the
absolutism of the central administration."
GEORGE OSTROGORSKY, HISTORY OF THE BYZANTINE STATE 67 (Joan Hussey, trans., rev.
ed., Rutgers Univ. Press 1969) (1954).
91. In this light consider the relationship of Justinian and Theodora to the mobs
controlling Constantinople at the height of the early Byzantine Empire.
Thus they split the Christians into two parties, each pretending to take the part
of one side, thus confusing both ... and then ruined both political factions.
Theodora feigned to support the Blues with all her power, encouraging them to
take the offensive against the opposing party and perform the most outrageous
deeds of violence; while Justinian, affecting to be vexed and secretly jealous of
her, also pretended he could not openly oppose her orders.
PROCOPIUS, SECRET HISTORY 54 (Richard Atwater, trans., Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1963)
(550).
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of the demands of the polity (second inversion).92 Inverted, we come
closer to a reality revealed by the story of Saul's kingship-because
leaders are dependent on political communities for their power (second
inversion) leaders will tend to further the desires of the political
community. Because political communities are strong and leaders
dependent, political communities can shift responsibility for their acts
onto their leaders. As a result, leaders bear the burdens of communal
acts in the name of the political community. In a world of competing
communities, these entities could minimize the extent of their risk of
destruction by creating a system of substitution. The basis of this
substitution was the premise that leaders serve as symbol of the
community. While communities survive, their debts to other
communities could be paid with the bodies of their leaders. Substitution
can be made plausible through a system in which authority symbolized
power. Thus, political communities protect themselves against their own
actions by setting up a system of action that posits communal action at
the insistence of their leaders. The punishment for infractions by a
political community, especially against another community, is borne by
the leader as proxy for the community. The doctrine of personal
responsibility for communal acts is thus an inversion for the protection of
the community. The leader is sacrificed so the community may continue.
Leaders don't necessarily lead unwilling populations. In return for
appearance of power, they serve as the community's representative vis a
vis other communities on whom communal rewards or punishments are
focused. Slobodan Milosevic is today learning the lesson of Saul. He
will be punished so that Serbia may continue.93
In this inversion we have a fine example of Nietzsche's notion of
ressentiment.94 Ressentiment acts as both a sword and a shield. As a
shield ressentiment is directed toward reaffirmation of a culture based on
powerlessness and the imposition of an obligation to protect those
embracing the characteristic-weak. As a sword ressentiment is directed
toward the imposition of systems shifting power from the strong-the
protectors, to the weak-the protected. Ressentiment permits control out
of perceptions of weakness, the great ironic inversion. Protection of
inversion itself requires miscausation, the necessity of error.
92. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS: GETTYSBURG TO
BOSNIA (Carla Hesse and Robert Post eds., 1999).
93. See Part Ill, infra.
94. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS I-Il to 13 (Walter
Kaufmann & R.J. Hollindale, trans., Vintage Books, 1989) (ZUR GENEALOGIE DER
MORAL, 1887).
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D. The last inversion: the community, the sheep, are in actuality the
Shepherd in a world arranged to minimize the costs of inter-
community conflicts for power.
This reversal is the most curious, this inversion of power. It turns
cause and effect on its head. If the leader is a proxy; if the political
community retains power, including the power to sacrifice the leader on
the basis of the artifice of leadership, then the sheep, the political
communities, are in actuality the Shepherd in a world arranged to
minimize the communal costs of conflicts for power between
communities of sheep. The authority of the leader is thus greatest in the
smallest but most obvious things, and least powerful in the most
fundamental. Power lies elsewhere within communities. 95 It lies in
culture, action and illusion.
Culture provides the abstract space where power lies. Fundamental
ordering norms, like God, exert an influence superior to the power of any
particular system of governance to overcome. Democracy, oligarchy,
tyranny or monarchy, the relationship between authority and control is
the same. "The true interest of an absolute monarch generally coincides
with that of his people. Their numbers, their wealth, their order, and
their security, are the best and only foundation of his real greatness; and
were he totally devoid of virtue, prudence might supply its place, and
would dictate the same conduct." 96  By sacrificing to God directly
without the intervention of Samuel, Saul defies the other fundamental
principle on which his kingship rests-the leader cannot directly
challenge the basis of social ordering. In this case Saul sought to become
king and priest, combining two offices in one. The excuse, expediency,
95. Indeed, kingship, priesthood, and the structures of governance and hierarchy
may just be symbols of the outward and impermanent forms that power takes. Power lies
in the community, taking form as an aggregate by exercised within a large ambit of
multiple relationships between individuals. The sum of these relationships provide a
snapshot of power. The institutions of authority merely provide the field in which this
power may be manifested from time to time.
It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the
multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and
which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through
ceaseless struggles ad confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them;
as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a
chain or system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which
isolate them form one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take
effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embedded in the
state apparatus, in the formation of the law, in the various social hegemonies.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, I THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 92 (Robert Hurley,
trans. Vintage Books 1990) (1978 trans.) (1976).
96. EDWARD GIBBON, I DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 106 (Modern
Library n.d.) (1788).
[Vol. 21:3
THE FOHRER PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
was insufficient to overcome the magnitude of the breach.
The social subsystems of every community provide the material
space through which power is manifested. These sub-systems, fields of
communal activity, create the social, economic and political hierarchies
through which social order is maintained. Individuals provide the key to
engaging the power of communal norms within these sub-systems.
Individuals invoke cultural norms to induce concrete action within
already developed social subsystems-the press, industry, the church,
academia, and other groups that replicate the organization of these
forms. 97
The application of these principles of invocation are reproduced at
every level of human endeavor-from collective action at the level of the
largest organizations, to the actions of even the lowest status individuals
within any collective. Modem students of organizational psychology
now remind us that:
A significant aspect of personal success in organizations is the ability
to identify and control seats of power and influence. To do so...
you first have to understand both your values and the values of those
around you. When all these values are clear in your mind, and only
then, you can move to the more rewarding task of approaching the
values of others in order to influence them to change their behaviors
in ways that satisfy your values.98
Individuals implement social practice through action, through
mobilization of individual within sub-groups who are motivated to act
through the invocation of cultural instructions-"greed is good," 'just
war," "equality of opportunity," and others have all been cultural
instructions invoked to mobilize social sub groups to act-and in acting
assert communal power. Thus, communal power does not lie with any
particular person, or in any particular position, or with an organization,
or in a particular thing, to the exclusion of others. Communal power lies
in the possibility of invocation-by any individual who can pull the
necessary cultural levers. In the West, these ideas are well understood,
and have been increasingly studied and rationalized by those who study
business.99
The practices of manipulation and persuasion, of pressing the right
97. Larry Catd Backer, What is a City?: Sovereign Organization in the 21" Century
(forthcoming; copy on file with author).
98. Roger Schenke, Forward, in CHARLES E. DWYER, THE SHIFTING SOURCES OF
POWER AND INFLUENCE i (American College of Physician Executives Rinaldi Publishing
Co.: 1991) (discussion of invocation for control within the sub field of medical
administration; see id. at 57-76).
99. See, e.g., ALAN ANDREASEN, MARKETING SOCIAL CHANGE (Jossey Bass, 1995);
VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS (Pocket Books, 1976) (1958).
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cultural levers for an intended effect, have been practiced well at the
state level itself The several realities of Ireland provide fertile ground in
this respect. Patrick Hanafin adroitly extracts the fiction from out of the
creation of the modern Republic of Ireland through the myth making by
elites for a public thirsty for those very myths. 00 Barry Collins has
extended this myth making from the 26 county Republic to the Island
itself. 101
Collectives, including nation-states outside the West have
internalized these patterns as well. Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe provides
a complex and rich example of the means of internal and external
manipulation. Internally, the issue of land reform, that is, of a
redistribution (or seizure) of land in the hands of white owners, many,
but all of which, 0 2 in turn had been seized at the beginning of the last
century, has proven fertile ground for pressing both internal and external
cultural levers. 10 3 Race tied to an increasingly fantasized colonial past
were used to mobilize an electorate for the perpetuation of an
increasingly corrupt order presided over by Mugabe's Zanu-PF party.104
Illusion provides the means for perpetuation of communal power-
for and against individuals as well as against the leader. In a world
constructed to demand payment for infractions from leaders,
communities pay for their infractions with their most debased and least
valuable coin. In order to make the payment more acceptable, illusion is
created. The leader is clothed in tremendous power. The leader is vested
100. See Patrick Hanafin, Constitutive Fiction: Postcolonial Constitutionalism in
Ireland, 20 PENN STATE INT'L L. REV. 339 (2002).
Yet paradoxically this projection of mythical rhetoric led to the instantiation of
a political reality that was to reflect the values of this imagined Gaelic
Romantic notion of Ireland. This new state was indeed a fake. Yet, it was for
its citizens only too real in its narrow minded, craven "bureaucratic dinginess."
This use of rhetoric by the elite reflects Threadgold's thesis that the telling of
stories by elites can lead to the creation of particular institutional realities.
Id. at 351 (citing TERRY THREADGOLD, FEMINIST POETICS: POIESIS, PERFORMANCE,
HISTORIES 148 (1997).
101. See Barry Collins, The Belfast Agreement and the Nation that "Always Arrives
at its Destination, 20 PENN STATE INT'L L. REV. 385 (2002).
102. MARTIN MEREDITH, MUGABE: POWER AND PLUNDER IN ZIMBABWE (2002) ("Like
many white farmers, the Buckles had bought their 1,000 acre farm after independence. In
accordance with government regulations, they had obtained a certificate declaring that the
government had no interest in the property." Id. at 167).
103. For a fuller account, see STEPHEN CHAN, ROBERT MUGABE: A LIFE OF POWER
AND VIOLENCE 147-180 (2003).
104. With Zanu-PF's claim to being in the best position to solve the land issue in
Zimbabwe, "albeit contradicted by two decades of land-reform failure, came some else: a
memory of an anti-colonial struggle that only Zanu can invoke, and an image of a time
when the party was in fact a Maoist-type 'fish within the sea' of the rural masses."
PATRICK BOND AND MASIMBA MANYANYA, ZIMBABWE'S PLUNGE: EXHAUSTED
NATIONALISM, NEOLIBERALISM AND THE SEARCH OF SOCIAL JUSTICE77 (2002).
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with the highest responsibility. Nations of tens and hundreds of millions
are reconstituted as servants of the leader's will. When the terror attacks
against the United States occurred on September 11, 2001, a name was
craved. A person not a people, a leader not a political community, was
responsible. With the emergence of a name-Osama bin Laden, 10 5 and a
command hierarchy-Al Qaeda,10 6 personification was possible. When a
formally organized political community was required to provide a
geography understandable in the common parlance of globalism, another
name emerged-the Taliban-not Afghanistan. From that point, the
culpability of Islam, of Saudi Arabia, of Pakistan, of Afghanistan,
vanished. And the United States, the prime adversary, went out of its
way to ensure that counterattack was aimed at the names, not at the
communities.10 7 The Afghans, a more traditional community, thought
and acted differently. For them, power and authority, responsibility, was
located within the community itself. Attacks against community
members followed-against Arabs, Pakistanis, heretics, and other
"foreign" elements.
The illusion thus created serves the power of community.
Punishment of the individual is communal; the state will use its power as
collective sovereign to punish an individual for inducing another political
community to act. The process of punishment chosen is neutral-the
purpose of which is to establish in a impartial forum the facts which will
serve to individualize communal activity deemed worthy of punishment.
A court, the judge, and trial cement the illusion with the authority of
truth. 10 8  Trials establish individual responsibility for acts over a
collective assignment of guilt. This reduces the call for revenge by the
victorious community and leads the way to reconciliation. 0 9 The people
105. See generally Elizabeth Becker, Nation Challenged: Hearts and Minds-A
special report.; In the War on Terrorism, A Battle to Shape Opinion, N.Y.TIMES,
November 11,2001, at IA.
106. See generally, id
107. Consider the great lengths to which the United States and its European allies
went to turn the characterization of the "enemy" from a people to a group of individuals
making up a modem version of a "bandit gang;" President Bush, on various occasions,
went out of his way to speak well of the larger communities-Islam, Pakistan, and the
like.
108. In this light, see Larry Catd Backer, Tweaking Facts, Speaking Judgment:
Judicial Transmogrification of Case Narrative as Jurisprudence in the United States and
Britain, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 611 (1998) (demonstrating how "all sides
attempt to use the courts as vehicles for the approval of lifestyle [and i]n this enterprise,
particular facts make no difference-cultural facts are the real issue).
109. Erin Daly, Transformative Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation, 12 INT'L
LEGAL PERSP 73 (2002). Daly cites Cassese's view that the principal accomplishments of
criminal trials are 1) to distinguish the culpable perpetrators from others within the same
broad class or ethnic category, 2) to dissipate calls for revenge because, essentially, the
victim has entrusted to the state the right to punish the perpetrator, 3) to foster
2003]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
thus experience vicariously the pain of unsuccessful communal action,
and avoid the temptation to repeat the error. Such error, is thus
transferred from the community to the leader, now punished, and the
community continues. Power remains veiled, within and between
communities.
I do not mean to suggest that the current system of human rights and
humanitarian law is fundamentally flawed and must be abandoned in its
entirety. The great success of the later half of the 20 h century was the
creation of a legal systemization of basic protections for individuals.
This system represents a noble reaction to a history in which certain
individuals-particularly Jews, Gypsies, and sexual minorities-had
been brutalized earlier in that century.' 10 But I do suggest that the great
edifice of humanitarian law and human rights is limited by the context
from out of which it was created. Global patterns of political
organization, and of conflict, were not universally represented in the
world conflict that ended in 1945, and the focus and character of conflict
has changed dramatically since the end of the 2 0 1h century. The nation-
state is no longer the ultimate expression of sovereign organization.
Civil society-a product of a long and brutal struggle in Europe and
North America-is not necessarily accepted as the highest and best
expression of political organization. Discrimination has become
fashionable again-covertly in the West, overtly everywhere else.
Oblivious to the increased importance of a range of new actors and new
techniques for conflict, the system of human rights and humanitarian law
no longer provides a satisfactory basis for the regulation of human
conflict. The story of Saul and Israel have produced a system of
regulation grounded in the relationships between Saul, the people of
Israel and God. The irony of its effects are only now being understood.
III. Context: The Liability Free Cultivation of Hatred in the Modem
World
Miscausation is at the heart of the power of community in the 21 st
century. Miscausation fuels the paradox which is the ftihrer principle.
Law provides the language for masking the obvious."' But
reconciliation by ensuring that perpetrators pay for the crimes which, Cassese seems to
posit is a precondition for reconciliation, and 4) create a fully reliable record of the past
atrocities.
110. For a history of the development of regional and global understandings of human
rights and humanitarian obligations, see e.g., R. Bierzanek, War Crimes: History and
Definition, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW at 29-31 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1987).
111. "The 'decision' that Carl Schmitt sees as marking the very possibility of law, the
identification and conflict of friend and enemy, and that he sees as running through the
whole system, shaping it and overdetermining it-this act of war represents the
maximum of factuality, cast as absolute immanence in the juridical system." ANTONIO
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miscausation, and the ftihrer principle, provides opportunity to
communities, as well as protection. Communities may act through
individuals and escape responsibility. Communities may educate,
prepare, sustain, encourage, and provide an ideology of action, but only
individuals are deemed responsible, under principles of humanitarian'
12
and human rights law," l3 for action. Though leaders of states may be
subject to the restraints of action, or may be forced to pay for the actions
of the community, the community remains untouched. But even leaders
of communities not organized as states may escape responsibility for
creating and maintaining the context through which action is planned,
supported and encouraged. Miscausation, and the rules for the
constitution of community have thus worked to subsidize action by non-
state groups like the IRA, the Tamil Tigers, the PLO, and protected their
political and propaganda wings from responsibility for the action of
individuals 'inspired by' the ideology, but acting as individuals
unconnected with the group. The imbalance of this legal result has
bedeviled states confronted by opportunistic communities not constituted
as states. Efforts to right this imbalance, to void the responsibility free
cultural subsidy of hate, to avoid the fantasy of legal construct for the
reality 'on the ground,' have proven problematic for the United States,
the United Kingdom, Sri Lanka, and Israel.
The extraordinary power of law to mask the obvious is nicely
evidenced by the 4 th Geneva Convention's rules for the protection of
civilian populations in time of war. In particular the use of the rules in
furtherance of the construction of the state of Palestine, in a certain form,
by the international community, provides a useful example of the
distorting effect of law in the context of 'passive' communities and
'active' individuals, as well as an oh-so-typical European tendency to use
the cover of law or 'principle' for targeted political effect, especially
NEGRI, INSURGENCIES: CONSTITUENT POWER AND THE MODERN STATE 8 (Maurizia
Boscgli, trans., Univ. Minnesota Press, 1999).
112. Humanitarian law is based on the principle of individual penal responsibility.
See Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to
the Victims of International Armed Conflict, adopted June 8, 1977, entered into force,
Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3-608, Art. 75(4)(b); Protocol II Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977, entered into Force, Dec. 7, 1978, U.N.
Doc. A/32/144 Annex II, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, Art. 6(2)(b).
113. Thus, for example, the American Convention on Human Rights extends due
process guarantees in ways that have been construed to limit responsibility to individuals
who act. See American Convention on Human Rights, (1978), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, Art.
5(3) ("Punishment shall not be extended to any person other than the criminal."). See
also African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, (1986), O.A.U. Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 ("Punishment is personal and can be imposed only on the
offender.").
2003]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:3
when Europeans deal with the detritus of its imperial past, as well as of
its bad behavior. The contortions become much more interesting when
two irreconcilable objects of Western, and especially European, guilt
clash. The Western world's Judenfrage1 4 in what was European and
Turkish imperialism's Palestinian playground,"15 and what is to become
the states of Israel and Palestine' 16 provides a nice example indeed.
What is emerging in the West as the standard, or orthodox, version
of a legal analysis of house demolitions is easy enough to summarize."'
The arguments usually start with an underlying postulate which blends
fact and a moral stance: The Israeli government has engaged in a large
number of house demolitions and sealing since 1967118 and this is bad.
The bulk of the argument then proceeds to find a neutral," 19 that is, legal,
114. 1 deliberately use a discredited (and historically offensive) term here to remind
readers of the spectre of(Western) history that haunts any discussion of the State of Israel
in Europe and the Western Hemisphere. The term was common in Central Europe in the
191h and 2 0 th century and eventually became connected with Nazi notions of separation
and ultimately extermination. See, e.g., DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING
EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST 63 (1996).
115. See TOM SEGEV, ONE PALESTINE, COMPLETE: JEWS AND ARABS UNDER THE
BRITISH MANDATE Haim Watzman, trans., 2000).
116. After the success of the American efforts to topple the dictatorial regime in Iraq
in 2003, the time was thought ripe to unveil and compel the Jews and Arabs to abide by a
"roadmap" leading to independence for a Palestinian State and recognition of the Jewish
State of Israel by Arab states. See Agence-France Presse, Israel's Sharon Sees Quicker-
Than-Expected Deal with Palestinians After Iraq [Corrected 04/13/03], 2003 WL
2778992.
117. For good expositions of the argument, see, e.g., Shane Darcy, Punitive House
Demolitions: The Prohibition of Collective Punishment and the Supreme Court of Israel,
21 PENN STATE L. REv.--(forthcoming Spring 2003); John Quigley, Punitive Demolition
of Houses: A Study in International Rights Protection, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 359 (1993);
Martin B. Carroll, The Israeli Demolition of Palestinian Houses in the Occupied
Territories: An Analysis of its Legality in International Law, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1195
(1990); Usama R. Halabi, Demolition and Sealing of Houses in the Israeli Occupied
Territories: A Critical Legal Analysis, 5 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 251 (1992); Cheryl V.
Reicin, Preventive Detention, Curfews, Demolition of Houses, and Deportations: An
Analysis of Measures Employed by Israel in the Administered Territories, 8 CARDOZO L.
REV. 515 (1987). For an early version from an organ of institutionalized
internationalism, see, e.g., Reconstruction of Palestinian Homes, Commission on Human
Settlements, U.N. Res. 11/10 in U.N. Division for Palestinian Rights, XI Bulletin No. 6,
at 12 (1988).
118. For some statistics from an organization within the State of Israel opposed to the
practice, see http://www.btselem.org/english/HouseDemolitions/Statistics.asp (Last
visited April 2003).
119. Americans, in particular, are acutely susceptible to arguments made from law,
especially though -which appear to apply normatively value neutral provisions. Americans
worship neutral principles-or at least the appearance of such principles. JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 88-103 (1980); Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
The allure of law as the old Englightment God-as-master-clockmaker-the divinity
creating a system of universal and perfect rules which only need to be followed for order
and optimality to result has long been understood in the West. For a perceptive
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basis to support a moral conclusion 120 drawn from an assessment of
fact.' 2' The first set of arguments revolve around the validity of
Regulation 119(1) of the Defense Emergency Regulations promulgated
by the United Kingdom before the end of its mandate in Palestine, 122 the
provision under which the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has undertaken its
demolitions. Regulation 1 19(1) is either invalid, having been revoked by
the United Kingdom at the end of the Mandate or that its provisions are
incompatible with international law. In particular, house demolitions
constitute an unlawful violation of property rights, 123 due process
protections to individuals charged under penal provisions of local law,1
2 4
commentary, see VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE (Norman Cameron, trans., Penguin Books, Ltd.
1997)(1759). For a modem critique from the perspective of Critical Race Theory, see
KimberlI Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation
in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1378-84 (1988).
And it is to the American market that many of these hoped for value judgment changing
arguments are made. In this respect the arguments have more value as culturally
significant speech, designed to move value judgments of the American voting population
in a particular direction, than as arguments of any value within the field of law per se.
See Larry Catdi Backer, Culturally Significant Speech: Law, Courts, Society and Racial
Equity, 21 U. ARK. LiTrLE ROCK L.J. 845(1999).
120. Of course, what I characterize as a moral conclusion is as easily characterized as
a political conclusion as well. I am not convinced that American traditionalists
(forgetting or forgiving for a moment their own particularized agenda masquerading as
yet another universal) are wrong when they assert that the moral and the political-or the
religious (since religion and morals have been inseparable from the time of the
repudiation of the ancient cults in the West) and the political-are two sides of the same
coin. See, e.g., RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1984) (arguing that religion has a legitimate place in
public discussion); Stephen L. Carter, Liberal Hegemony and Religious Resistance: An
Essay on Legal Theory, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 25 (Michael W.
McConnell et al. eds., 2001); but see BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL
STATE 280-82 (1980). Thus, perhaps, the issue of house demolitions is interesting for
law in part because it serves as a convenient vehicle for an indirect political assault on the
hegemony of the State of Israel in certain territories meant to serve the state building
needs of others.
121. Indeed, even the "finding" of facts-especially facts targeted for a particular
result-has become of the essence to political negotiation. See, e.g., Arthur Lenk, Fact-
Finding as a Peace Negotiation Tool-The Mitchell Report and the Israeli-Palestinian
Peace Process, 24 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 289 (2002).
122. The Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945 (as amended until 2nd March,
1947) (1947) (Great Britain); [1945] Palestine Gazette (No. 1442), Supp. No. 2, 1055.
123. Art. 53 of the 4th Geneva Convention prohibits the destruction of property except
when "rendered absolutely necessary by military operations." See 4 h Geneva
Convention, supra note 7. Article 23 of the 1907 Hague Regulations provides a special
prohibition on the destruction of enemy property "unless such destruction or seizure be
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war." Regulations annexed to Convention
IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War n Land, signed at The Hague, Oct. 18, 1907
(the "1907 Hague Regulations").
124. 4th Geneva Convention, supra note 7. In addition, the 4th Geneva Convention
imposes a number of due process rights in connection with the enforcement of penal
provisions, including the right to a trial (art. 71), to information about the charge (art. 71),
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protections against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or• 125
punishment, or protections against collective punishment.26 under
international law.
The standard legal arguments, of course, are contestable on their
own terms. Because my purpose here is to escape the bounds of the
fiihrer principle of international law that perverts any analysis, I suggest
only some. For example, an important basis for the legal attack on house
demolition focuses on the invalidity of the legal basis Israel has put
forward to justify its policy-Regulation 119. That attack comes in two
forms-first, that the Regulation was revoked by the time Israel
recaptured the territories from its Jordanian occupiers in 1967 and,
second, that the Regulation, even if effective, is inconsistent with
international human rights obligations. The double form of the attack on
Regulation 119 is necessitated by history. Let us consider the first
objection. Since Regulation 119 was enacted and invoked with impunity
by the government of the United Kingdom during the Mandate in
Palestine, and since it would be troublesome now to suggest that the pre-
1948 actions of a European and Christian power might have, at the time,
violated core principles of international law, it is necessary to suggest
that the Regulation was no longer in effect after the end of the Mandate.
But that argument is hardly incontestable-whatever the desires of the
international political community otherwise. Israel has put forward
arguments in support of the continued validity of the Regulation. 27 To
the extent the argument is plausible, that should be the end of the
analysis. A different result--consistently applied-might suggest the
loss of sovereignty so fundamental that the core understanding of the
basic character of what it means to be a nation-state would disappear.
to representation (art. 72), to present evidence (art. 72), and to appeal a judgment (art.
73). For similar requirements, see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, art. 17, entered into force March 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in
6 INT'L LEG. MAT. 368 (1967), at art. 14 (penal sanctions may be imposed only after a
full and fair trial).
125. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. res. 39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 151 at 97,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), article 16. A certain portion of the international community
has given its political judgement that house demolitions might under certain
circumstances amount to violation of this provision when practiced by Israeli military
authorities. See Concluding Observations on Third Periodic Report Submitted by Israel,
CAT/C/XVII/Concl.5 of 23, Nov. 2001, 6(j).
126. Article 50 of the 1907 Hague Regulations prohibits assessments of general
penalties against the population for individual acts. Article 33 of the 4 th Geneva
Convention prohibits punishment of protected persons "for an offense he or she has not
personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or
of terrorism are prohibited." 4 th Geneva Convention Art. 33(1).
127. See, e.g., Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the
Administered Territories, 1 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 262 (1971).
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Applying the argument, as made by the critics of Israel's house
demolition policy, it would be possible to challenge the validity of any
regulation by any democratically constituted sovereign, even after that
sovereign's supreme judicial organ passes on the issue. A plausible
result, no doubt, but one that as yet is still somewhat beyond the current
reality of state practice. European courts, especially, have rejected
similar notions in the context of a much more coercive quasi-
international system-the European Union.
128
Second, if the fairly technical legal invalidity argument fails to
convince, then the violation of international law argument might
succeed. But the argument poses some awkward issues precisely
because it is necessary to distinguish use of that authority by European
Christians until 1948 (permissible) and semi-European Jews after 1948
(bad) under international law. Thus, the arguments based on the
prohibitions against general penalties in the 1907 Hague Regulations,
29
rings hollow in light of the enactment of Regulation 119 in the face of
the prohibition. To the extent that the 1907 Hague Regulations are
reinterpreted especially to suit the character of the present Israeli-
Palestinian conflict suggests something other than the application of
neutral principles in a principled way. Indeed, the argument is especially
ironic when made in the context in which it is declared that the 1907
Hague Regulation were "by 1939, declaratory of the laws and customs of
war."
130
There is a more principled method of making the distinction
between the acts of Christian Britain and that of the Jews under
Regulation 119. The instruments of that distinction, of course, are the
various human rights and humanitarian instruments which came into
128. Thus, for example, "German courts continue to reserve the power to review and
judge the activities of the Community institutions in light of basic German ideas of
fundamental rights and German interpretations of the powers of Community institutions
under the EU Treaty. This stands in stark contrast to the ECJ's pronouncement of its
supreme power to determine the scope and enforcement of fundamental social norms."
Larry CatA Backer, Forging Federal Systems Within a Matrix of Contained Conflict: The
Example of the European Union, HARVARD JEAN MONNET WORKING PAPER, No. 4/98
(1998); 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1331, 1371 (1998) (citing Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 &
2159/92, Brunner v. European Union Treaty, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57 (BVerfG 1993);
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und
Futtermittel, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540 (BVerfG 1974)).
129. Art. 50 provides, in part, a prohibition against general penalties inflicted upon
general population "on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be
regarded as jointly and severally responsible." See, 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note
124.
130. See Darcey, supra note 118 (citing in part International Military Tribunal,
Judgment 83, 1947, NAzI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION: OPINION AND JUDGMENT
(1947)).
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effect after the end of the British Mandate in Palestine.131  First, of
course, it is not at all clear that Regulation 119 conflicts with the
provisions of the Convention.1 32 Additionally, it ought to be difficult to
make an argument which effectively requires a belief that the United
Kingdom sought, in ratifying the various human rights and humanitarian
instruments now used against Regulation 119, to suggest that its own
prior conduct in Mandate Palestine, especially with respect to the use of
that Regulation, was a model of serious human rights abuses against
which international human rights conventions were written. Instead, it is
plausible to suggest that Regulation 119 might be better understood as a
model of appropriate military conduct, but one which, at least when
applied by the IDF, has become unpopular.
The violation of protections against penal sanctions under internal
law argument is particularly telling. The argument is based on a
suggestion that nice civilized countries do not use property confiscation
as a penalty except the property of the accused and only after
conviction. 133 But the United States permits the confiscation of property
that is not entirely owned by the person committing the underlying
crime. 134 And confiscation of property for violation of administrative
rules, where there is no underlying illegality is also permitted, though
subject to a Constitutional rule of proportionality.' 35  But these
arguments serve as a veil to the real dispute-a political dispute in which
131. Thus, for example, Article 64 of the 4 th Geneva Convention, supra note _, is
sometimes deployed to suggest that Regulation 119 must be void as in violation of the
terms of that International Covenant. Article 64 provides that only law that is not an
obstacle to the application of the Geneva Conventions may remain in force. The official
commentary makes the point in stronger terms: "when the penal legislation of the
occupied territory conflicts with the provisions of the Convention, the Convention must
prevail." COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION IV OF 1949 RELATIVE TO THE
PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIMES OF WAR 336 (Jean Pictet, ed., 1958).
132. See discussion above at notes 120, 121.
133. See, e.g,, John Quigley, Punitive Demolition of Houses: A Study in International
Rights Protection, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 359, 365-366 (1993).
134. See Bennis v, Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996) (no innocent owner defense to
confiscation of car used for the solicitation of prostitutes by husband who was co-owner
of vehicle seized). Moreover, what Marcus Dubber has suggested in the American
criminal context may have some bearing in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: "The
paradigmatic crime of the war on crime is not murder, but possession; its sanction not
punishment, but forfeiture; its process not the jury trial, but plea bargaining; its mode of
disposition not conviction, but commitment; and its typical sentencing factor not victim
impact, but dangerousness as "evinced" by a criminal record. "Marcus Dirk Dubber,
Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 829, 833 (2001).
135. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (seizure of about $360,000
for failure to report transportation out of the country; though the entire amount was
subject to forfeiture, the court permitted assessment of $15,000 forfeiture holding that
punitive forfeitures, forfeitures grossly disproportionate to offense violates Constitution).
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legal arguments with respect to the deployment of Regulation 119 are
used as a weapon in a political battle over the ultimate shape of the
settlement between the State of Israel and what will be the State of
Palestine. 136
In addition, the argument that application of Regulation 119 violates
the 4th Geneva Convention's prohibition against collective punishment
suggests a misreading of that provision of the 4th Geneva Convention as
well as the opinion of the Israeli Supreme Court that construed it. Article
33(1) prohibits punishments for offenses not personally committed.
Regulation 119 permits punishment of those who have committed,
abetted the commission, been accessories after the fact of any act of
violence as defined in the Regulation. Punishment is not imposed for the
act of violence; the actual perpetrator of that violence remains solely
liable for its consequences. However, Regulation 119 also punishes
abetting and aiding the perpetrators of violence. Punishment, therefore,
is tied to personal conduct-the abetting of the act or the 'acting as an
accessory after the fact to the commission of the offense. In this sense,
then, it can be argued that the 4th Geneva Convention is not violated
because Regulation 119 does not permit the imposition of collective
punishment. That, I think, was the point that Justice Ben-Dror might
have been trying to make in his opinion in Daghlas v. Military
Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region.137  That such a
construction, itself, would violate the 4th Geneva Convention, would
suggest that all penal laws imposing penalties on aiding and abetting, on
conspiracy, on liability for post act aid, might no longer be valid. 38 Or,
more nonsensically, that such provisions, while perfectly valid within a
nation state as a core part of its criminal laws, would not be valid when
applied by an occupying power.' 
39
136. "The demolitions have drawn such sharp criticism not only because they are
unlawful in and of themselves, but because they are viewed by the international
community as part of Israel's broader effort to settle its citizens in the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank, and to pressure Palestinians to leave these territories .... The demolition
issue is part of a larger violation by Israel of Palestinian rights in the Gaza Strip and West
Bank, and is addressed by the international community in that light." Quigley, supra
note 134, at 374.
137. HCJ No. 698/85, 40(2) P.D. 42. This construction makes sense of the judge's
conclusion that "'punishment' has not been imposed on the homes of the uninvolved
persons, and it is difficult to understand the origins of the claim that we are here dealing
with a case of collective punishment." Contrast the discussion in Darcy, supra, note 118.
138. But see Quigley, supra note 134, at 368-369 (suggesting that Regulation 119
permits the assessment of liability in contexts significantly more broad than those in
which liability is imposed for conspiracy or aiding and abetting).
139. An additional irony to these arguments, of course, is that those who make them
almost invariably then conclude that some sort of undifferentiated Israel ought to be
responsible for the resulting grave breaches of the 4 th Geneva Convention. See, e.g.,
Darcy, supra note 118.
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For what it is worth, and it seems to be worth very little to those
who would single mindedly seek to have Israel cease its demolition
policy, Israel is not a signatory to all of the international conventions
deployed against it. 140  Perhaps those who deploy international law
against the State of Israel are also suggesting another principle of
customary international law-a non-signatory principle of binding.'14
Under it, execution and ratification of a convention by the elected
representatives of a democratic polity is no longer necessary in some
contexts for the convention to have effect. Consequently, the principles
and norms of certain instruments of human rights and humanitarian law
establish principles of conduct binding on all. 42 And this process of
binding through international osmosis appears to trump that other
principle of international law-the principle of democratic political
organization. Thus, for example, building a case against house
demolitions on the basis of the American Convention on Human
Rights, 14 the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 144 the 3rd
Geneva Convention,145 Additional Protocol 1,146 Additional Protocol II,
147
the 1907 Hague Regulations,148 the 4 th Geneva Convention,"49 as binding
140. Thus, for example, Israel has not signed the Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions, see Additional Protocol 1, supra note 50, and Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977, entered into force Dec. 7,
1978, U.N. Doc.A/32/144 Annex II, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 ("Additional Protocol II"). See
FRAN(COISE BOUCHET-SAULNIER, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HUMANITARIAN LAW 460
(Laura Brav, ed. & trans., 2002).
141. Along parallel lines, see Anthony D'Amato, Human Rights as Part of Customary
International Law: A Plea for Change of Paradigms, 25 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 80
(1995/1996).
142. Critical, then, for international law arguments, is acceptance of the notions of the
creation of "universal" norms as expressed in instruments that might or might not have
been ratified universally, and their applicability without the benefit of direct expression
by the local sovereigns. "U.N. practice also reflects the applicability of human rights law
in belligerent occupation." The U.N., in a General Assembly resolution, stated that
"[flundamental human rights, as accepted in international law and laid down in
international instruments continue to apply fully in situations of armed conflict." John
Quigley, Punitive Demolition of Houses: A Study in International Rights Protection, 5 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 359, 363-64 (1993). Cf Ivan Simonovic, From Sovereign Equality to
Equally Reduced Sovereignty, 24 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 163, 171-172 (2000)
(development of international legal regimes limit the exercise of state sovereign
authority).
143. American Convention on Human Rights (1978) 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
144. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1986), O.S.U. Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5.
145. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 7.
146. Additional Protocol 1, supra note 50.
147. Additional Protocol II, supra note 50.
148. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 124.
149. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 7.
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as an international convention cocktail by operation of principles for the
recognition and creation of principles of customary international law, 5°
makes a mockery of the treaty system and irrelevant expressions of
national free will in choosing not to participate in particular expressions
of agreement among some, but not all, nations. On the basis of the
theory sought to be used to bind Israel, the United States will eventually
(sooner rather than later) find itself bound by the convention creating the
International Criminal Court,1 5 ' even though the United States
specifically refused to ratify the treaty. 152
The standard argument against house demolition from the
perspective of international law thus provides no clear answer to the
issue of house demolitions. Indeed, the arguments suggest the limits and
flaws of an international law regime that is complicit in the protection of
community from the acts it encourages in its individuals, especially in
individuals who die for their trouble. A miscausation analysis, however,
more realistically reveals both the potential for perversity in the
application of the fuhrer principle of international humanitarian law, and
the possibility of an alternative perspective. Consider the community
and the articulation of its norms through official organs of state secular
and religious organization. Listening to religious broadcasts over state
sponsored Palestinian television on any Friday one can hear that:
The Jews are the Jews. There was never among them a supporter of
peace. They are all liars.., the true criminals, the Jewish terrorists
that slaughtered our children, that turned our wives into widows and
our children into orphans, and desecrated our holy places. They are
terrorists. Therefore it is necessary to slaughter them and murder
them, according to the words of Allah... it is forbidden to have
mercy in your hearts for the Jews in any place and in any land. Make
war on them anyplace that you find yourself. Any place that you
meet them-kill them. 1
53
150. See, e.g., Darcy, supra note 118. See also, Theodor Meron, The Geneva
Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 348 (1987).
151. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, UN Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999 (entered into force July 1,2002).
152. Indeed, fears of similar acts of binding led the United States to seek bilateral
agreements with signatory states to protect American troops abroad. For accounts in the
popular press, see US to Focus on South Asia, Mideast Seeking ICC Immunity Deals,
Agence France-Presse, Nov. 14, 2002, 2002 WL 23649558 ("US diplomats will soon
focus their efforts to negotiate deals giving US troops immunity from prosecution by the
International Criminal Court (ICC) on nations in South Asia and the Middle East").
153. Dr. Ahmed YousoufAbu Halabiah, Palestinian television, Oct. 13, 2000, quoted
in Itamar Marcus, Islam 's Mandatory War Against Jews and Israel in Palestinian
Authority Religious Teaching, Studies on Palestinian Culture and Society [Study No. 4],
March, 2002 (study prepared for Palestinian Media Watch, an Israeli organization based
in Jerusalem). Dr. Halabiah was, at the time, a member of the Palestinian Sharianic
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Perhaps, instead, one might listen on Fridays to Dr. Muhammad
Ibrahim Madi on Palestinian TV say:
A youth said to me: "Oh, Sheikh, I am 14 years old. I have 4 more
years and then I will blow myself up among Allah's enemies, I will
blow myself up among the Jews." I told him: "Allah should let you
merit martyrdom..." We will blow them up in Hadera, we will
blow them up in Tel Aviv and in Netanya in Allah's righteousness
against this riff-raff. 1
54
Or perhaps one might read the newspaper instead so that one can
understand that "The battle with the Jews will surely come ... the
decisive Muslim victory is coming without a doubt.., and the Day of
Resurrection will not come without the victory of the believers over the
descendants of the monkeys and the pigs and with their annihilation."
155
Or maybe one can solace in prayer: "Allah, show us your
wonderous capabilities on the Jews. Allah, show us on the Jews a day
like A'ad and Tha'mud. Allah, transform them into spoils of war for us
and for all Muslims.
156
Rulings Council and Rector of Advanced Studies, the Islamic University.
154. Sheikh Dr. Mohammed Ibrahim Madi, Friday Sermon on PATV, Aug. 3, 2001,
quoted in Itamar Marcus, Islam's Mandatory War Against Jews and Israel in Palestinian
Authority Religious Teaching, Studies on Palestinian Culture and Society [Study No. 4],
March, 2002.
155. Sheikh Muhammed Abd Al Hadi La'afi, AI-Hayat A1-Jadida (newspaper), May
18, 2001, quoted in Itamar Marcus, Islam's Mandatory War Against Jews and Israel in
Palestinian Authority Religious Teaching, Studies on Palestinian Culture and Society
[Study No. 4], March, 2002. Sheikh Dr. La'afi was reported at the time to be responsible
for religious teaching and instruction in the office of the Waqf in the official newspaper
of the Palestinian Authority, Al-Hayat Al-Jadida.
156. Sheikh Dr. Mohammed Ibrahim Madi, Friday Sermon on PATV, May 4, 2001,
quoted in Itamar Marcus, Islam's Mandatory War Against Jews and Israel in Palestinian
Authority Religious Teaching, Studies on Palestinian Culture and Society [Study No. 4],
March, 2002.
There are some within the Greek Orthodox priesthood in Israel itself who have
publicly shared these views. One of them, Father 'Atallah Hanna, Archimandrite
Theodosios Hanna, the former spokesperson of the Greek Orthodox Church, in a sermon
marking the Epiphany and the baptism of Jesus at a Greek Orthodox cathedral in
Jerusalem, January 19, 2003, stated:
We declare publicly our blessing, support, and legitimization of the brave
Palestinian resistance [carried out] by any means, including the brave Fidaiyin
martyrdom operations.... The names of the Fidaiyi Shahids [the martyrs] will
be inscribed in the history of our Palestinian and Arab people in holy white
letters. The voices of those who defame these acts of heroism and honor are
nothing more than anomalous voices that do not represent Arab and Palestinian
public opinion....
Palestinian Christian Leader in Praise of Martyrdom Operations and the Formation of a
Muslim and Christian Human Shield to Defend Iraq, Special Dispatch Series No. 459,
The Middle East Media Research Institute, available at
http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=palestinian&ID=SP45903#
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Within the quiet of family, it ought to be possible to escape the
construction of a privileging of violence as the foundation of a reactive
social order. But even the house serves multiple purposes. In an
interview with the mother of a suicide bomber in a London Arabic
language newspaper, the interviewee described how her house was used
as a center for the coordination of violence, and the effects of this use of
her house on the son who would become a suicide bomber:
Imad lived with us for 14 months, and he had a room in our house
from which he would plan the operations. The mujahideen would
come to him and plan and sketch everything out, and little
Muhammad would be with them, thinking andTPlanning. This was
the source of Muhammad's love of martyrdom.
Reconsider the suicide bomber, or other perpetrator of violence, in this
context. Here is a context in which, from a cultural perspective, the call
to violence is so pervasive as to become invisible.158 It has international
appeal as well, with leaders of other states providing financial support to
the families of suicide bombers, 159 as well as international Islamic
organizations sometimes characterized as charitable.' 60 In the context in
ednl (Jan. 23, 2003).
157. Interview with Umm Nidal in The London-based Arabic-language daily Al-
Sharq AI-Awsat, reprinted as Interview With the Mother of a Suicide Bomber, Special
Dispatch Series No. 391, The Middle East Media Research Institute, available at
http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=palestinian&ID=SP39102
(June 19, 2002).
158. The support is pervasive enough to provoke little shame when ordinary people
are polled to determine their attitudes. "A new poll of Palestinians found that roughly
60% support continuing suicide bombings and military operations inside Israel, while
only 15% believe a violence-free strategy best serves Palestinians." Robin Wright and
Henry Chu, the World Mideast 'Road Map' Detailed an International Plan Calls for a
Provisional Palestinian State this Year, Preceded by an End to Violence. Also, Israel
must Halt Settlements. Los ANGELES TiMES, April 29, 2003, 2003 WL 2401630. While
the sentiments expressed in the polls do not usually translate into action-they can
translate into a public and communal expression of support and permission.
159. One of the reasons Saddam Hussein enjoyed a high status among Palestinians
was his willingness to provide financial support, as a reward for good behavior of sorts,
to the families of suicide bombers. See, e.g., Karbet Leggett, The.Assault on Iraq: Rising
Arab Protests Unsettle Region's Stability, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, March 24, 2003,
2003 WL-WSJ 3962668 ("Mr. Hussein enjoys broad support in the West Bank and Gaza,
in part the result of the financial assistance he gives to Palestinians who carry out suicide
attacks against Israelis."). The support, to the extent it is real, can be substantial. "Last
week, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld repeatedly noted Saddam's financial support
for the families of Palestinian suicide bombers. He said Iraq had recently increased its
payments to such families from $10,000 per family to $25,000." Barbara Slavin, Middle
East Turmoil Shakes Up U.S. Plans for Iraq, U.S.A. TODAY, April 8, 2002, 2002 WL
4723539.
160. For a recent example described in the popular press, see, Dena Bunis, Vik Jolly,
and Ann Pepper, Home from ordeal /i/ People-Dr. Riad Abdelkarim, Freed from an
Israeli Jail, Denies That His Humanitarian Mission Was Linked to Terrorist Groups, THE
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which she lives, her society has crafted a privilege to violence against the
"other" in a way reminiscent of a different sort of privilege to violence
and subordination against African-Americans in the United States after
the Civil War. 16 1 Indeed, violence appears as little more than a necessary
claim to self-defense the 'apes and pigs' who now constitute Israel. 62
The popular press of the region is full of articles about the vileness of the
habits and practices of this "other":
Shortly after the Palestinian intifada against Israeli rule began in late
September 2000, Hammouda wrote an article that appeared in
Egypt's main daily newspaper, Al Ahram, that also repeated the
"blood libel" against Jews. Although the article flatly stated that the
practice was continuing, with Israeli Jews taking the blood of
Palestinian children to bake Passover matzo, Hammouda now says he
doesn't believe that the practice is contemporary-but that it did
occur in Damascus, Syria, in the 1800s.
163
From a cultural perspective, then, it may appear to the suicide bomber
that her conduct is not only appropriate, but necessary for the protection
of children, a religiously positive act, a political act of the highest order,
ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, May 21, 2002, 2002 WL 5449466 ("Evidence strongly
suggests that the HLFRD has provided crucial financial support for families of Hamas
suicide bombers, as well as the Palestinians who adhere to the Hamas movement,"
according to an FBI memo.").
161. Christian Sundquist put it nicely:
Despite occupying privileged social positions, white people tend to claim
innocence so long as they do not actively discriminate against Blacks or other
groups. Indeed, many white people have great difficulty even recognizing the
existence of privilege. Privilege is transparent to the privileged because it is
enveloped within what they view to be the normal state of affairs. In addition,
belief in the American value of individualism inhibits seeing privilege, as
people tend to view themselves as individuals rather than beneficiaries of
collective advantage accrued by skin color.
Christian Sundquist, Critical Praxis, Spirit Healing, and Community Activism:
Preserving a Subversive Dialogue on Reparations 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 659,
674-75 (2003).
162. "Calling Jews 'apes and pigs' is very common in the antisemitic discourse of the
Arab world, particularly in Islamist circles. For the most part, the term is used as a
synonym for Jews, or in strings of epithets originating in the Koran and Muslim tradition
regarding Jews." Yigal Carmon, Harbingers of Change in the Antisemitic Discourse in
the Arab World, The Middle East Media Research Institute, Inquiry and Analysis Series,
No. 135, available at http://www.memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?lD=IA13503 (April 22,
2003) ("In the past two years, however, the Arab media has reflected significant criticism
of, and reservations regarding, manifestations of antisemitism in the Arab world." Id.).
163. Michael Slackman, Saudi Editor Retracts Article That Defamed Jews, Los
ANGELES TIMES, MARCH 20, 2002, 2002 WL 2462517 (quoting Adel Hammouda, editor
in chief of the Egyptian newspaper, Sawt al Umma). The article also related the
retraction, after the Western press picked up translations of the story to the
embarrassment of the Saudi government, of a story by a Saudi Doctor purporting to
document the use of non-Jewish blood to make Jewish holiday dishes.
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and one for which the state or its supporters would compensate her
family for the loss of her life. From this cultural perspective, it is also
easier to sense the web of subsidy, extending from all of the community
to all of the community for such acts of violence. With every act, every
member of the community is benefitted in tangible and intangible
ways-the enemy is weakened or made to suffer in an effective way, the
community is spared responsibility for the individual's acts but can
continue to nurture the sort of foundational norms which produces more
acts of individual violence. From this cultural perspective, then, it is also
possible to understand demolition as a culture to culture act-a culturally
targeted response to cultural subsidies of violent individual activity.
Ironically, the standard international law analysis of house
demolition policy in the context of unconventional warfare might benefit
by an analysis from a Critical Race Theory perspective. 64 In particular,
the sort of spirit injury, 165 that might justify, or at least ameliorate the
criminality, of individual or group behavior is particularly apt.
At the group level, spirit injury can lead to the devaluation and
destruction of a way of life or an entire culture. What has been
ignored in the L.A. 8 case as beyond the scope of immigration law is
the reality of life for all Palestinians worldwide. In their decades-old
quest to establish an independent state, the Palestinian people have
suffered many violations of their human rights, including exile,
family dissolution, land dispossession, death, torture, and
imprisonment. They have also faced a "web of racism, cultural
stereotypes, political imperialism, dehumanizing ideology ... and it
is this web which every Palestinian has come to feel as his uniquely
punishing destiny.'I
66
164. See Adrien Katherine Wing, Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee. A Critical Race Perspective, 31 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 561 (2000)
(application of insights from Critical Race Theory to enhance understanding of rights and
injuries in group global context to support rights of residents to support PLO in the
United States).
165. For an excellent application of the principles to an understanding of the context
of action by individuals in Palestine and the Palestinian diaspora, see Adrien Katherine
Wing, A Critical Race Feminist Conceptualization of Violence: South African and
Palestinian Women, 60 ALB. L. REV. 943 (1997); Adrien Katherine Wing, Reno v.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee: A Critical Race Perspective, 31
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 561 (2000). Professor Wing has also applied the concept in
the context of the Rwandan genocide of the 1990s. See Adrien Katherine Wing and
Mark Richard Johnson, The Promise of a Post-Genocide Constitution: Healing Rwandan
Spirit Injuries, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 247 (2002). See also Patricia Williams, Spirit
Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Finger Pointing as the Law's Response to
Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127 (1987).
166. Adrien Katherine Wing, Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee: A Critical Race Perspective, 31 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 561, 589 (2000)
(quoting in part EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 27 (1978)).
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The irony of the conflict which forms the context in which house
demolitions become an 'issue' of international law ignores a spirit injury
in which in their millennia old quest to establish an independent state, the
People of Israel in the diaspora have suffered many violations of their
human rights, including exile, family dissolution, land dispossession,
death, torture, and imprisonment. The People of Israel, and especially
those that constitute the political community of the State of Israel, have
faced a web of cultural stereotypes, political imperialism, dehumanizing
ideology which continues long held Western (and now Eastern)
traditions of a uniquely punishing identity. 67 The great insight of spirit
injury, drawn from Critical Race Theory, adds a richness to an
understanding of both the Palestinian "rage of terrorism-revenge,
retribution, and hatred,"'168 and the scope of Israeli response. 169 Where
the levers of popular culture, of religion, of state policy (even when
perpetuated by quasi-states or other intangible entities) are directed
167. The internalization of these forms of racism can follow particularly circuitous
routes. Consider, in the Middle East, how modern views may have been assimilated, in
part, from the understanding commonly held when the populations were all substantially
Christian-prior to the first Muslim invasions. While the populations may have
eventually embraced Islam, the earlier popular attitudes, fully developed within the pre-
Islamic Byzantine State, would have remained the same. See ELIZABETH REVEL-NEHLER,
THE IMAGE OF THE JEW IN BYZANTINE ART (David Maizel, trans., 1992).
But the Middle East has also borrowed extensively from the calumnies created in
Western Europe in the years after the Islamic conquests of 7th centuries. Only recently
the Saudis indulged in the old blood libel against the Jews. See Michael Slackman, Saudi
Editor Retracts Article That Defamed Jews, Los ANGELES TIMES, MARCH 20, 2002, 2002
WL 2462517. The Egyptians, a nation not noted for freedom of expression, defended on
freedom of expression grounds, a television serial, developed for popular consumption, in
which the perfidy of the Jews formed the core of a story line. See Yigal Carmon,
Harbingers of Change in the Antisemitic Discourse in the Arab World, The Middle East
Media Research Institute, Inquiry and Analysis Series, No. 135, available at
http://www.memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=IA13503 (April 22, 2003) (with reference
to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion). Within states actively manipulating the levers of
popular cultural development in these ways, it becomes more difficult to understand
arguments based on sole individual liability for acts of violence.
168. Adrien Katherine Wing, Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee: A Critical Race Perspective, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 561, 591 (2000)
(Professor Wing notes that such action "can only lead to politically, socially, and morally
unacceptable cycles of death and destruction." Id). But see Paul Butler, By Any Means
Necessary: Using Violence and Subversion to Change Unjust Law, 50 UCLA L. REV.
721 (2003) (limited violence is justified under just war theories to combat race based
executions).
169. See, e.g., http://www.btselem.org/PRESS/980514.htm. These, as Professor
Wing notes, might ultimately be politically, morally, and socially unacceptable to outside
communities. However, these actions invariably need not be legally unacceptable, either
as applied against the rules arising from out of the fuhrer principle of international law
and responsibility, or as applied against another community where the action is targeted
to the manifestation of a cultural subsidy of individual acts of violence meant to pervert,
or use to advantage, the international legal system of individual culpability.
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toward subsidizing, encouraging, and rewarding, on a tangible or
intangible level, then the miscausation of modem international
humanitarian law works at its most effective to shield the community for
its actions. Suicide bombers provide the most efficient utility of the
miscausations inherent in the ftihrer principle: the community
collectively provides the normative foundation within which suicide
bombers can be recruited, trained, and deployed, but only the bomber is
liable for her acts of violence. Yet where the bomber dies along with her
targets, then responsibility is altogether avoided. What was true enough
in the Rwandan genocide of the 1990s applies with equal force in the
context of slow motion genocidal acts through the mechanisms of suicide
attacks: "Both international and domestic procedures need to
acknowledge that massive atrocities usually involve massive complicity
by large numbers of perpetrators, at all levels of domestic and
international society, and not merely by a select group of government
elites."17
It is in this context that the socio-politics of Zionism becomes
relevant to the legal construct which is the fiihrer principle of
international law. Here again, the insights of Critical Race Theory can
help us understand better the perversity of the increasingly accepted
canard put forward that suggests that the mechanics of popular cultural
hatred are targeted against 'Zionists' and 'Zionism' and not 'Jews.
' 171
Most of the advocates of the Zionism-is-evil and Zionists-are-bad-but-
we-all-like-and-respect-'Jews' formulation tend to go out of their way to
make the distinction between the two. But sometimes the advocates of
the distinction forget. That, apparently, occurred during the recent U.N.
sponsored racism conference in South Africa. "Books freely distributed
by the Arab Lawyer's Union contained cartoons again equating Israelis
with Nazis, and picturing Jews with hooked noses, blood dripping from
their hands, and fangs." 172 But both Critical Race Theory and Queer
Theory reveals a deeper and less benign meaning of this rhetorical trope.
It remains, however, to speak of remedies. Remedies are most
usefully considered as a set of political choices. This becomes quite
apparent with respect to the remedy of house demolitions for acts of
violence. Merely because a case can be made for house demolitions and
170. Jos6 E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons Form Rwanda, 24
YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 467 (1999) (suggesting larger scale domestic legal action).
171. The genesis of this approach to modem Judeophobia first found institutional
expression in the condemnation by the United Nations of Zionism as racism. See G.A.
Res. 3379, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34 at 83, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975). For
a discussion of the politics of this resolution within the United Nations, see, THOMAS M.
FRANCK, NATION AGAINST NATION 205 (1985).
172. Anne Bayefsky, The U.N. World Conference Against Racism: A Racist Anti-
Racism Conference 96 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 65, 67 (2002).
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sealings does not mean that such a policy is either politically efficient nor
optimally directed at the entity with the greatest culpability. In its
narrowest sense, house demolitions target a strong locus of cultural
expression within Palestinian culture-the family and clan structure. As
I suggested, it is possible to construct arguments within the confines of
the ftihrer principle itself to suggest sufficient culpability as aiders and
abettors or co-conspirators of the suicide bombers. It is also possible to
understand demolition as a culture to culture act-a culturally targeted
response to cultural subsidies of violent individual activity. For good or
ill, these justifications tend to ring hollow within emerging international
popular culture, now accustomed to a heightened solicitude for the
'innocent' individual and fierce in the protection (and freedom from
responsibility) accorded to state culture (but not necessarily the state and
its representatives).1 73 The irony here, but one familiar to Critical Race
Theory, is that the success of the cultivation of group hatred within
popular international culture itself tends to privilege a particular stance, a
particular construction of the legal apparatus of the fiihrer principle that
protects from adverse consequences the machinery of cultural or group
hatred and its privileging of violence against the other, 174 while limiting
punishment solely to those who will die in furtherance of the violence
encouraged, and who, as a consequence, will escape legal penalty
completely.
The major difficulty of house demolitions as remedy is, when
173. See, e.g., David L. Nersessian, the Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling
Jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunals, 37 Tx. INT'L L. J. 231 (2002)
(genocide convention); Matthew Lippman, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Forty-five Years Later, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 1, 36-39 (1994) (cultural genocide).
174. Professor Sunder suggests, examining the way religion can impede the human
rights of women under international human rights norms, that religious fundamentalists
take advantage of modern human rights law's view of religion as
natural, irrational, incontestable, and imposed-in contrast to the public sphere,
the only viable space for freedom and reason .... Failing to recognize cultural
and religious communities as contested and subject to change legal norms such
as the "freedom of religion," the "right to culture," and the guarantee of "self-
determination" defer to the claims of patriarchal, religious elites, buttressing
their power over the claims of the modernizers .... In short, human rights law,
not religion, is the problem.
Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 133, 1402-1403 (2003). Indeed, as
Professor Sunder suggests, the character and identity of Islam "is an especially important
issue in places such as Mali, the Philippines, South Africa, and Palestine, where officials
are considering reform of personal, customary and religious law." Id. at 1439. In that
context, officials must be given incentives, as well, to change customary teachings about
the Jew as a religious "other" and the permission, inherent in that customary view, to do
violence to this other when the other fails to act as ordered, or as a Muslim deems
appropriate. Cf Barbara Flagg, "'Was Blind But Now I See ": White Race Consciousness
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993).
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considered outside the narrowing boundaries of thefiihrer principle, that
it is both overinclusive and underinclusive. The policy of house
demolition as remedy is underinclusive because it tends to produce a
windfall to all of the members of the political community that either
benefit from (directly or indirectly) the cultivation of hatred or who
(directly or indirectly) cultivate the hate that constitutes a cultural
permission to engage in acts of terror. As such, only some, but not all of
the beneficiaries, of cultural hate, are made to bear the burden of
responsibility which should be shared by all who benefit. It is also
underinclusive to the extent the policy targets only one community. It is
overinclusive to the extent the policy tends to include within the
community of hate those persons who may not be members of the
community, but whose family members are. Thus, the policy tends to
include within its sweep people who may have chosen to deny or reject,
in public and affirmative ways, inclusion in the community which gives
cultural permission to violence.
Commentators who have acknowledged the problem of collective
complicity, whether in the form of state or popular responsibility, have
suggested a variety of alternatives. "In the contemporary era, many
societies are grappling with constructive responses to spirit injury,
including 'rhetorics of history (truth), theology (forgiveness), justice
(punishment, compensation, and deterrence), therapy (healing), art
(commemoration and disturbance), and education (learning lessons). ' ' 175
Others, more accepting of the postulates of the flihrer principle, continue
to argue in favor of judicial or quasi judicial remedies against individual
representatives or actors within a community that does wrong.1
76
I would suggest a different, and much more traditional approach-a
tax or fee on cultural violence. There are any number of ways of
implementing such a tax. I will suggest one. The tax would have the
character of a capitation tax, assessed against all of the members of the
community, men, women and children. The tax would be assessed at
every instance of violence against any of the members or property of the
target community-that is, whenever an act of hate violence is
perpetrated against individuals targeted as objects of hate by the
175. Adrien Katherine Wing, Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee: A Critical Race Perspective, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 561, 591 (2000)
(quoting, in part, MARTHA MINow, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 147 (1998)). Professor Wing makes the
distinction between collective and individual remedy: "Concretely, the cures can include
individual counseling, individual criminal prosecutions, individual suits for damages or
restitution, individual or collective apologies, international criminal tribunals
(Nuremberg, Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda), truth commissions (South Africa),
repatriation, and reparations (Japanese Americans)." Id.
176. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 171.
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community maintaining a ."web of. cultural stereotypes, political
imperialism, dehumanizing ideology."' 7 7  Because the world is still
organized on the basis of the nation-state, the source of payment would
be the nation-state. Every nation-state in which national or subnational
groups, officially or unofficially, directly or indirectly, participate in the
privileging of violence would have an obligation to pay the tax forthwith
from their treasuries for cultural violence occurring within their
jurisdiction. 178
A cultural hatred tax affirms the power of a community to constitute
itself through opprobrium-to generate as a positive cultural value a
hatred of and the condoning of violence against, others, on the basis of
culturally distinct characteristics. But the tax would also compensate
those who feel manifestations of that hatred directly. And because the
condoning or perpetuation of hatred is a wrong shared by all of the
members of the community, the tax would serve as a personal penalty for
complicity in a culture that subsidizes violence through the cultivation of
hatred. The effect is to remove the shield from liability that the fiihrer
principle provides communities without doing harm to the necessity of
connecting individuals to individual wrongs. Thus, even for those who
cling to the formalist legality of the emerging human rights and
humanitarian law frameworks, a cultural hatred tax provides a ready
connection between those who profit by, subsidize or perpetuate hatred
which is manifested in violent acts against others, and the penalty
imposed.179
The tendency at this point, especially among western trained
lawyers might be to smirk and dismiss. To the extent the smirk is
grounded on the refusal to look beyond the individual to the communal
context in which individual action is institutionalized, I can only repeat
that such narrow formalist blindness to the strength of culture and the
177. EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 27 (1978).
178. The states would then have whatever tax and borrowing authority to make up the
call on their revenues through other means.
179. A distinction, of course, must be made between political acts and acts generated
or subsidized by cultural hatred. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, the
argument would be made, and indeed the international community prefers to characterize
the dispute as strictly political in nature. This, in its own way, was the brilliance of the
idea of separating Zionism-a disease carried by all Jews and perhaps by some others-
with Judaism (the religion) itself. It is a fine distinction that permits an ostensible
secularization of the conflict, without robbing it of its important religious dimension-
because all Jews are, by definition either Zionists, or capable of slipping into Zionism at
any opportunity. The distinction was harder to make in the disputes that tore apart the
old Jugoslavia between Catholic Croats, Muslim Bosnians, and Orthodox Serbs. Indeed,
the Balkans provides fertile ground for imposing a system of cultural hatred taxation on
the population as a means of extracting the violence subsidy provided by cultures
promoting hatred of each other.
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contextualization of individual action within the web of cultural
permissions and taboos' 80 will continue to provide a legal basis for
communities to promote individual acts of violence in furtherance of
perverse communal lusts-racism, anti-semitism, ethnocentrism and the
like'"'-without fear of liability. I would suggest, however, that my
proposal is steeped in the most foundational of liberal Western thought.
A culture tax serves not only a compensatory purpose, but a
symbolic one as well. I am suggesting that these notions, so well
established with respect to individuals, ought to have as great an effect
on the conduct of intangibles-juridical, political, religious, social or
other communal persons. A culture hate tax, assessed on communities, is
also efficient. Its primary benefit is to turn something harmful to
productive effect-using of the mechanics of thefiihrer principle against
itself by turning upside the mechanics of the cultural subsidy of suicide
bombers and their families. The tax or assessment, administered through
the very state apparatus that encourages the deployment of a normative
system of hate and demonization, is meant to cancel in tangible and
intangible ways the cultural subsidy, in a rough but symbolically pointed
sense.
In this last respect, the tax or assessment shares something in
common with one of the foundations of modern Western law-the old
Germanic codes. It seems appropriate, in a clash of societies
characterized by a modern rhetoric of hate and an ancient form of
vendetta, to refer back to an ancient normative structure focused on the
elimination of the utility of vendetta.
It was in an attempt to prevent the long-term ill effects of vendettas
and blood-feuds that the Germanic customary law, as observed by
Tacitus, provided for the payment of set levels of compensation as
reparation for the commission of specific injurious acts. In Anglo-
Saxon England, this customary practice was condoned by the Church
and memorialized in the first and subsequent sets of kings' laws....
The kings' laws also expressly prohibited violent acts of self-help-
vendettas and acts of vengeance-under most circumstances, and
required, instead, that dis utants resolve their disputes peacefully,
through the legal process.
180. See Larry Catdi Backer, Chroniclers in the Field of Cultural Production:
Interpretive Conversations Between Courts and Culture, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 291
(2000).
181. See Larry Catd Backer, Altheimer Symposium on Racial Equity in the 21st
Century: Culturally Significant Speech: Law, Courts, Society and Racial Equity , 21 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 845 (1999).
182. Valerie A. Sanchez, Towards a History of ADR: the Dispute Processing
Continuum in Anglo-Saxon England and Today 11 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1, 14-15
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But money, while an effective compensatory proxy for returning to a
status quo ante, is hardly ever enough. I might suggest that the
international legal community might also profit from one of the rare
successes of cultural reformation-that of postwar Germany. Perhaps
the German constitution provides a rough guide to additional
provisions-aimed at both groups and individuals-that would also serve
to help communities avoid the temptation of hate. In particular, the
German constitutional provisions ensuring the implementation of a
militant democracy, wehrhafte Demokratie, might be useful in the
context in which house demolitions seem so inevitable a response to a
culture that condones, even encourages and rewards, violence. In the
German context, "[f]undamental rights may be limited or even forfeited
(under the terms of Article 18) if they are used to combat or to abolish
the constitutional order .... Article 9(2) of the Basic Law prohibits
associations whose 'purposes or activities . . . are directed against the
constitutional order or the concept of international understanding.',
83
Article 5 imposes a limitation on arts and science, research and teaching.
None of these may be used as a means to "absolve from loyalty to the
Constitution."' 8 4 Most important, perhaps, Article 21 limits the freedom
of political parties which "seek to impair or abolish the free democratic
basic order or endanger the existence of the Federal Republic .... 85
The German Federal Constitutional Court supported the banning of the
Sozialistische Reichspartei 186 and the German Communist Partyl 87 on
this basis. Combined with a focus on collective responsibility for
communal encouragement of violence, an adoption of the system of
provisions designed to foster a militant and open democracy, such as
those in place in the German Republic, might be far more effective in
mediating violence-of both groups and individuals-than the reliance
on the amorphous, and usually unhelpful generalities of international
(1996) (citing to C. TACITUS, THE AGRICOLA AND THE GERMANIA 73 (R. B. Townshend
trans., 1894) (observing that feuds could be ended by "the payment of a fixed number of
cattle and sheep, and [that] this [plan of] compensation [was] ... greatly to the public
advantage, for feuds where men have so much freedom are exceedingly dangerous.").
183. DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 217-218 (2 nd ed., 1997).
184. See, GG Art. 5(3), quoted and translated in DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 508 (2 nd ed.,
1997).
185. See GG Art. 21(2), quoted and translated in DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 511 (2 nd ed.,
1997). Americans, especially, find this provision foreign. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE,
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 213 (1994).
186. Sozialistische Reichspartei Case, 2 BverfGE 1 (1952).
187. Communist Party Case, 5 BverfGE 85 (1956)
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law. 188
A culture tax also respects the fundamental principle of human
dignity,'8 9 as well as the principle that there should be a direct
relationship between action and responsibility that adversely affects the
human dignity of others. A tax, imposes costs but does not order any
particular sort of response. It is left to the community itself to respond to
the incentives or disincentives created by its normative structures, to
change, or refuse to change when the externalities of hate are required to
be internalized in a humane way. Such importation of the externalities of
hate permit the culture, by its own hand, to develop normative responses
unrestrained by the normative values of others. Moreover, the cultural
hate tax is not meant to be a substitute for current international law, but a
necessary supplement. Effective responsibility of all members of
cultural community for its cultural acts leave undisturbed the architecture
of individual responsibility for violent actions.
Again, the insights of critical race theory suggest both the relevance
and importance of a tax on culturally cultivated hatred, assessed against
all of the members of the hating community. Foundational work in this
field, like that of Charles Lawrence and Kimberl Crenshaw,190 remind
us of the ways that individuals, as a community, both construct and profit
by cultures of hatred and subordination of a chosen other. Indeed, in the
United States, much of the criticism of American jurisprudence is an
implicit condemnation of the fihrer principle as applied to the internal
law of the United States (especially in the context of 14 th Amendment
jurisprudence). The movement seeking reparations for African-
Americans is in part based on a discomfort with the fiihrer principle of
law as a dangerous form of subsidizing race hatred.'19 Indeed, the United
188. These ideas are developed in more detail in, Larry Cati Backer, Leviticus as
International Law: Milosevich and the Utility of the German Solution to Communal Strife
(forthcoming; on file with author). Indeed, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, a mutually enforced provision like that if GG Art. 9 might be quite useful.
189. See, e.g., GG Art. 1 ("Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect
it shall be the duty of all state authority."), quoted and translated in DONALD P.
KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 507 (2 nd ed., 1997).
190. See Charles R. Lawrence 111, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Kimberld Crenshaw, Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
191. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 374-80 (1987) (demonstrating how
adherence to a narrow vision of fault and causation based on a direct physical connection
are an impediment to acceptance of reparations as a remedy for past socially subsidized
wrongs); Rhonda V. Magee, Note, The Master's Tools, from the Bottom Up: Responses
to African-American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies
Discourse, 79 VA. L. REV. 863, 913-16 (1993). Professor Magee generalizes this
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States, like other nations before it, has begun to take tentative steps in
this direction. 
192
But do not confuse the indictment of the perversities of theflihrer
principle of international law as a plea for communitarianism or
communitarian ideals, except perhaps in its most ironic and perverse
sense. With communitarians, I agree that the essence of the individual is
her tie to the communities to which she belongs. 193 Rather than suggest
community as a source of state building, I accept the idea that
community, and communal norms, have a privileged position in the
constitution of the nature and character of the state. I suggest that with
this privilege ought to come not immunity but obligation, in the form of
legal responsibility, for the construction and maintenance of communal
norms privileging violent individual acts against others. Community, in
the sense I use it here, is hardly enough.
194
V. Conclusion
I would like to end where I started-with core cultural archetypes.
This time I return not to what the Christians call the Old Testament, but
to the New. In John, the understandings and consequences of the deal
made by the People of Israel with God come to fullness. Jesus is
sacrificed to the Romans by the hand of the People of Israel, so that the
nation might live. The story, unique to John, is well known, though
usually misinterpreted in the standard commentaries:
Many of the Jews therefore, who had come with Mary and had seen
what he did, believed in him; but some of them went to the Pharisees
and told them what Jesus had done. So the chief priests and the
Pharisees gathered the council, and said, "What are we to do? For
this man performs many signs. If we let him go on thus, every one
will believe in him and the Romans will come and destroy both our
holy place and our nation." But one of them, Caiaphas, who was
high priest that year, said to them, "You know nothing at all; you do
not understand that it is expedient for you that one man should die for
the people, and that the whole nation should not perish. He did not
rejection as applied to 14 Amendment jurisprudence in later work. See Rhonda V.
Magee, the Third Reconstruction: an Alternative to Race Consciousness and
Colorblindness in Post-slavery America, 54 ALA. L. REV. 483 (2003).
192. See, e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese-American Redress
and African-American Claims, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 477 (1998).
193. For a discussion of the nature and character of communitarian community, see,
e.g., Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 685, 692-719 (1992).
194. For another argument about the limits of communitarianism in the context of
state building, see, e.g., Wendy Brown-Scott, The Communitarian State: Lawlessness or
Law Reform for African-Americans?, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1209 (1994).
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say this of his own accord, but being high priest that year he
prophesied that Jesus should die for the nation, and not for the nation
only, but to gather into one the children of God who were scattered
abroad. 195
Here is a story of an altogether different form of kingship and sacrifice
built into the framework of Western thought. Alan Watson captured the
essence of this passage well:
They faced a dilemma. In the eyes of some or even many Jews, Jesus
was a special person deserving protection, but if he were not
sacrificed, the whole nation would perish. For the Romans to come
and take Jesus would be no solution. Some people would see that as
an affront and rebel, thus likewise endangering the nation. The
Sanhedrin had to take the initiative in arranging Jesus' destruction.
196
In John we are presented with a variation of the story of the kingship of
Saul. In John's retelling, from God-the inescapable normative context
of their constitution-the people have secured a proxy against
destruction, for when the community errs or is threatened, it is their
proxy, the king, who pays in the place of the community. The Lamb of
God serves as the shield, a necessary shield it would appear from the
inevitabilities set into motion by the birth of Jesus, for a community that
bears responsibility but must be preserved.1'9 But here the Lamb is not
the King of Israel-Saul-a man appointed as surrogate on earth by God,
but rather an aspect of the Divine power manifested as a man, who
combines again both the royal power ceded by God to the House of
David and the unlimited power of the Divine.' 98 John, thus, attempts a
closure in the rupture between God and His community created by the
original demand for a king in what, for Christians, would be the only
possible way-through the re-effectuation of ultimate divine sovereignty
195. John 11:45-52 (Rev. Standard Ver.).
196. ALAN WATSON, JESUS AND THE JEWS: THE PHARISAIC TRADITION IN JOHN 55
(1995) (describing the rabbinic tradition of the sacrifice of one so that the nation might
live as developed during the period in which the Gospels were written, id. at 54-57).
197. Jews, of course, might read the passage with a great deal of irony, given the
peculiar way in which the Christian community took the fundamental message of the
sacrifice to heart, at least with respect to the Jews.
198. This accorded with the connection between God and man in the ceremonial of
the scapegoat-Leviticus 16:7-8 ("And he shall take the two goats, and set them before
the Lord at the door of the tent of meeting. An Aaron shall cast lots upon the two goats;
one lot for the Lord and the other for Azazel."). The Lord's goat was to be offered for
sacrifice, the other "shall be used for making atonement by sending it into the desert as a
scapegoat." Leviticus 16:10. This also accords, for Christians seeking a physical
manifestation of the promise made by the Divine through the Prophets of a time when
God will again become the shepherd of the Divine flock, Ezekiel 34:1-34:19, with the
fulfillmetn of that promise.
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in the form of a facet of God made man. But the Divine cannot be
contained by the limits of the physical body. The Divine kingship must
be brought back "home." Thus, the manifestation of Divine power is
again activated through sacrifice-the one for the many. Thus removed
again from direct contact with the world, the community can once again
mediate its relations to God (its nomos) through the miscausations of the
individual-elevated to actor or leader. 199
John's retelling of the story of Jesus and Pharisees confirms the
enduring importance of the Saul story as a template for human behavior.
This template survives the Crucifixion, even for Christians, who must
await the return of the "King of Kings" and the (re)establishment of the
divine order on earth. This template has even survived religion, to find
expression in the formation of the core mores of international law: the
leader has authority, the community has control; the leader may
command, but the community follows its own passions. The community
cultivates the ideology of the individual, free will and power, but
constrains each; those who appear to lead, to act-those communal
surrogates of communally understood divine will, the divine surrogates
on earth-also serve as the surrogates for communal responsibility for its
wants, desires and actions. By continuing to fix the communal gaze on
the Divine, by cultivating error, in this case through the construction of a
"divine" international law of individual responsibility, communities can
continue to live through the sacrifice of individuals as incarnations of the
nation. In an ironic sense, then, this is an international law of Biblical
200proportions.
Communities-the nation-state, religious communities, terrorist
organizations-are arranged through a cultivation of error. Nietzsche
understood these as errors of causation: mistaking causes for effects,
199. Thus, for Nietzsche, the concentration of the disjunction between Jesus as
evangel, and what was thereafter made of Jesus, the redeemer, so that, in death, the
emerging Christian community could convert Jesus into an image of themselves.
[T]he frenzied veneration of those totally unhinged souls no longer endured the
evangelic conception of everybody's equal right to be a child of God, as Jesus
had taught: it was their revenge to elevate Jesus extravagantly, to sever him
from themselves-precisely as the Jews had formerly, out of revenge against
their enemies, severed their God from themselves and elevated him. The one
God and the Son of God-both products of ressentiment.
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist, supra note 42, at 40 (615-616).
200. The error of the emerging international legal order, its dangerous
incompleteness, thus joins that of its predecessors-religion and morality: "Morality and
religion belong altogether to the psychology of error: in every single case, cause and
effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing something to be
true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its causes." Friedrich Nietzsche,
Twilight of the Idols, supra note 19, at 499.
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assuming a false causality, creating an imagined causality, and assuming
a free will. These errors of causation are the tools of certain individuals,
or classes of individuals, for the purpose imposing authority over a
community. These structural hegemonists-the judge, the priest, the
king, the president, the charismatic leader of violent sub-national
communities-all of these are the stuff of theory. Nietzsche shows us
how, from the individual perspective, priest and error can be dangerous.
Yet Nietzsche also confirms how priest and error can be of great value in
the deployment of institutions to control communities. In contrast, the
community itself, those who are led, dominated, controlled, manipulated,
are considered only in the passive. They are the victims, the weak-
willed, the powerless, the sheep, the herd. They obey because they
must.
20 1
Yet authority is not control. Reality is more subtle and layered than
a direct relationship between authority and control. Again, Nietzsche
provides valuable insight on the relationship between ruler and ruled.
Just as the priest, the leader can use miscausation to preserve individual
authority, so the community uses miscausation to assert communal
power-over the priest, the president, the judge, the leader. In an ironic
twist of causation I will argue that the priest, the legislator, the leader
does not usurp dominion over the herd. Instead, the herd, for its own
preservation as a herd, demands the overlordship of the leader. Leaders,
held up as an independent actor, are better understood as the sword and
the shield of the communities of the powerless over whom they appear to
assert an independent authority.
I have offered an extended Nietzschean joke: the necessity of error.
The cult of the leader in modem legal, and political theory itself
constitutes a titanic act of mis-causation in four parts: (1) that
communities are protected not because they are weak, but because they
are strong, to protect the community against blame for action committed
in its name by its leaders; (2) that the leader is dependent on the
community, that is the leader acts in conformity to the wishes of the
people; (3) that the leader then serves as proxy for the community; the
doctrine of personal responsibility for communal acts protects a
community by sacrificing its leaders for acts of communal wrongs; and
(4) that the community, the sheep, are in actuality the Shepherd in a
world arranged to minimize the costs of inter-community conflicts for
power.
For modem political and legal theory, this mis-understanding can
problematize the most imperative legal logic of the last century. I
offered an example from the public sphere-the relationship between
201. NIETZSCHE, GENEALOGY OF MORALS, supra note 95, at 1-10-14.
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community and principles of personal responsibility in international
humanitarian law. If indeed, the herd is master, if it is the herd, through
its levers of cultural, ethnic, or political instruction that teaches, prepares,
supports, incites, encourages, condones, and sends out an individual-
whether directly or indirectly-to actualize the will or "fantasy will" of
the people, then the bearer of legal, moral and political responsibility
should not be limited to the individual instrumentality of group hatred-
the suicide bomber, the rock thrower, the saboteur-but should embrace
as well the community that spawned these instrumentalities of hatred, of
group will.20 2  If the community uses as a shield against liability the
individual who acted, ought not the members of the community, as well
as its leaders, also bear responsibility for the communal acts that
educated, prepared, and sent the individual off on her mission? Modern
humanitarian law avoids the question and focuses singlemindedly on the
individual. My discussion suggests that the answer may not be as clear
cut as the humanitarian jurisprudence and philosophy of the years after
the Second World War have made it appear.0 3 Or, perhaps, the answer
is simple-where law offers the possibility of perversion, of its use
against itself-then politics dictates that the possibility will be made fact.
Hiding behind the dead in the Israeli-Palestinian Wars, and profiting
immensely therefrom within the battleground of world opinion, seems to
have served at least one side of that war well indeed, but at a terrible
price. For whatever be the end of that conflict, the great communal
202. There is a connection here, of course, between group will as a valid object of
legal responsibility, and the ancient North African idea of 'asabiyah-group feeling, as
the intangible but powerful force that holds a group together, and that forms the basis and
grounding of every individual action. The term in Arabic is "asabiyah." 'ABD-AR
RACHMAN IBN KHALDJN, THE MUQADDIMAH: AN INTRODUCTION TO HISTORY (Franz
Rosenthal, trans., N.J. Dawood, ed., 1967) (1377) (Muqaddimah (Introduction) to Kitdb
al- 'Ibar (Book of the History of the World) at 97-119. Ibn Khaldun intuited that
communities have a natural life like individuals (id. at 136); and posited a cyclical
existence for individuals and communities based on a variety of perceived factors and
conditions, leading nowhere but to patterns of repeatable human condition. See also
Robert W. Cox, Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order:
Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun, in GOVERNMENT WITHOUT GOVERNMENT:
ORDER AND CHALLENGES IN WORLD POLITICS 132, 153 (James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto
Czempiel, eds., 1992) ('asabiyah is the form of intersubjectivity that pertains to the
founding of a state; id.).
203. 1 have considered, with a certain amount of irony and double meanings, Peter
Fitzpatrick's quite astute observation, in the context of a far more complicated analysis,
that "[w]hat, then, impels law is not, contrary to standard attribution, the enduring
achievement of a determined or posited certainty. An achieved certainty would simply
and fully 'be' and there would be no call for law. Law is called upon to effect certainty
always in the face of uncertainty." PETER FITZPATRICK, MODERNISM AND THE GROUNDS
OF LAW 69 (2001). Yet certainty can serve to conceal and misdirect as well as to reveal
and direct. Modern humanitarian law tends to do both-reveal and make certain with
respect to individual action, and conceal and misdirect with respect to communal activity.
[Vol. 21:3
THE FUHRER PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
mechanisms of hate-the most potent tool for converting individuals into
weapons of war-will not have been dismantled, and the community that
created it will not suffer in the least because of it.
Perhaps Palestine offers us, in this respect, an important lesson for
the 21st century: cultural power free from restraint, the utility of
disassociating individual action from communal incitement to act, and
the cultivation of collective hatred as a protected value of international
human rights law. The necessity of the creation of a Palestinian political
entity within the dar al-Islam should not blind the West to the price is has
been willing to pay to achieve this end. Hatred of another, cultivated as a
core value of socio-religious and political organization, can long survive
its utility to the international community. The dissolution of Yugoslavia
into its ethnic and religious components should have provided a warning;
but it did not. The grand lesson for the 21 s' century will surely be that
National Socialism and its horrors did not constitute a comprehensive
catalogue of human evil, and a legal structure built to prevent National
Socialist atrocities will prove wholly inadequate to confront persistent
and collective evil in this century.
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